

AL-GHAZALI'S SOJOURN IN DAMASCUS AND JERUSALEM

The comparatively numerous studies on al-Ghazali have left an important period of his life as obscure as it has always been. His decision to relinquish the post of chief mudarris at the Nizamiyyah in Baghdad, his subsequent sojourn in Syria, and his pilgrimage to the Hijaz are, of course, known in general terms, if only from his own very brief autobiographical account in *Al-Munqidh min ad-Dalal*. But I know of no special study devoted to al-Ghazali's visit to Syria. Even the fat volume containing the papers read at the ninth centenary held in 1380/ 1961 in Damascus strangely lacks a paper on al-Ghazali's stay in that city. The references to the visit by some of the contributors to the volume are not only cursory but at times also contradictory.

The aim of the present study is to throw light on that important episode in the life of al-Ghazali and, in particular, to suggest a connexion between his decision to leave teaching and a desire to commune with a mystic then living and teaching in Damascus. This study is also designed as an introduction to the most tangible and authenticated product of the visit to Syria, a tract on dogmatic theology which was composed in Jerusalem and called *ar-Risalah al-Qudsiyyah*. An edited text of the tract itself and an annotated translation thereof form the second and third parts of this contribution respectively.

Al-Ghazali was thirty-eight years old when he made the momentous decision. He had already examined the various branches of knowledge known in his time and investigated the ways of the learned in each of them, and had come to the conclusion that the ways of the mystics were the most conducive to bliss in this world and salvation in the next.

Later in life he himself described this process of mental and spiritual experience autobiographically in *The Rescuer from Error*. The following passage is reproduced from the admirable translation by Montgomery Watt, with a few suggested corrections, emendations, and explanatory notes:

‘For nearly six months beginning with Rajab, 488, I was continuously tossed about between the attractions of worldly desires and the impulses towards eternal life. In that month the matter ceased to be one of choice and became one of compulsion. God caused my tongue to dry up so that I was prevented from lecturing. One particular day I would make an effort to lecture in order to gratify the hearts of my following, but my tongue would not utter a single word nor could I accomplish anything at all.

‘This impediment in my speech produced grief in my heart, and at the same time my power to digest and assimilate food and drink was impaired; I could hardly swallow or digest a single mouthful of food. My powers became so weakened that the doctors gave up all hope of successful treatment. “This trouble arises from the heart”, they said, “and from there it has spread through the constitution; the only method of treatment is that the anxiety which has come over the heart should be allayed.”

‘Thereupon, perceiving my impotence and having altogether lost my power of choice, I sought refuge with God most high as one who is driven to Him, because he is without further resources of his own. He answered me, He who “answers him who is driven (to Him by affliction) when he calls upon Him”. He made it easy for my heart to turn away from position and wealth, from children and friends.

‘I openly professed that I had resolved to set out for Mecca, while privately I made arrangements to travel to Syria. I took this precaution in case the Caliph and all my friends should oppose my resolve to make my residence in Syria. This stratagem for my departure from Baghdad I gracefully executed, and had it in my mind never to return there. There was much talk about me among all the religious leaders of Iraq, since none of them would allow that withdrawal from such a state of life as I was in could have a religious cause, for they looked upon that as the culmination of a religious career; that was the sum of their knowledge.

‘Much confusion now came into people’s minds as they tried to account for my conduct. Those at a distance from Iraq supposed that it was due to some apprehension I had of action by the government. On the other hand those who were close to the governing circles and had witnessed how eagerly and assiduously they sought me and how I withdrew from them and showed no great regard for what they said, would say, “This is a supernatural affair; it must be an evil influence which has befallen the people of Islam and especially the circle of the learned”. ‘I left Baghdad, then. I distributed what wealth I had, retaining only as much as would suffice myself and provide sustenance for my children. This I could easily manage, as the wealth of Iraq was available for good works, since it constitutes a trust fund for the benefit of the Muslims. Nowhere in the world have I seen better financial arrangements to assist a scholar to provide for his children.

‘In due course I entered Damascus, and there I remained for nearly two years with no other occupation than the cultivation of retirement and solitude, together with religious and ascetic exercises, as I busied myself purifying my soul, improving my character and cleansing my heart for the constant recollection of God most high, as I had learnt from my study of mysticism. I used to go into retreat for a period in the mosque of Damascus,

going up the minaret of the mosque for the whole day and shutting myself in so as to be alone.

‘At length I made my way from Damascus to Jerusalem. There I used to enter into the precinct of the Rock every day and shut myself in.

‘Next there arose in me a prompting to fulfil the duty of the Pilgrimage, gain the blessings of Mecca and Medina, and perform the visitation of the Messenger of God most high (peace be upon him), after first performing the visitation of al Khalil , the Friend of God (God bless him).

‘I therefore made the journey to the Hijaz. Before long, however, various concerns, together with the entreaties of my children, drew me back to my home country) ; and so I came to it again, though at one time no one had seemed less likely than myself to return to it. Here, too, I sought retirement, still longing for solitude and the purification of the heart for the recollection (of God).

There are conflicting reports concerning the date of al-Ghazali’s return to Baghdad and consequently the length of his stay in Syria. Subki reproduces the testimony of ‘Abd al-Ghaflar al-Farisi, a contemporary and an acquaintance of al-Ghazali, and this testimony makes the length of the Syrian visit ‘nearly ten years’. Subki also quotes Dhahabi, who had it from Ibn ‘Asakir, that the visit lasted ‘about ten years. Although Subki adds that he was unable to trace this report in Ibn ‘Asakir’s Tarikh or Tabyin , the report does actually occur in Ibn ‘Asakir.

It is clear that al-Farisi’s report is not a direct one, coming as it does via an author who lived some two centuries after al-Ghazali. Ibn 'Asakir’s near-contemporary report would be less assailable if it were not contradicted by the testimony of a pupil of al-Ghazali who will be quoted presently. The report of ten years’ stay in Syria makes plausible another report that al-Ghazali visited Egypt and lingered for some time in Alexandria, contemplating a visit to Yusuf b. Tashfin in al-Maghrib. But here Subki is dubious; he cites the report of a visit to Egypt under ‘stories’, wa-yuhka ‘ anhu hikayat.

There are, however, better reasons for rejecting the ten years report. In 491 a.h. the Saljuks, who were al-Ghazali’s patrons, lost Jerusalem to the Fatimids, who were not his doctrinal favourites, to put it very mildly. There was little in the Fatimid system that could have attracted al-Ghazali to their dominion in Egypt or induced him to remain on the fringe of it in Syria. Had he been in Syria in 492 could he have failed to feel the shock of the Crusades and their capture of Jerusalem in Sha'ban of that year? But there

is more conclusive evidence that al-Ghazali was not then in Syria. According to his pupil, Abu Bakr b. al-'Arabi, he was back in Baghdad, less than two years after leaving it. Abu Bakr, who had, like al-Ghazali, performed the pilgrimage in 489, states clearly that in Jumada II, 490 he heard al-Ghazali expound 'his book which he called Ihya' in Baghdad.

The impediment in his speech and the general physical weakness which al-Ghazali suffered seem to have been no more than contributory factors for his decision to change his mode of life: give up the highest post in the learned profession, abandon family and wealth, and migrate to another land. His motives have long been the subject of speculation. One scholar suggested that he fell from favour with the authorities, and another that he feared assassination at the hands of the Batinites for his fierce attacks against them.

To accept the first suggestion is to cast doubt upon the sincerity of al-Ghazali himself who rules it out categorically. The scholar who made this suggestion has himself written in the same article that 'his [al-Ghazali's] story rings true from beginning to end' and elsewhere that the account in the autobiography 'cannot be doubted. To accept the second suggestion is not only to discredit al-Ghazali's own statement but also to overlook the leisurely and public manner of al-Ghazali's departure from Baghdad, after giving due notice to the authorities, making provision for the support of his dependants, installing his brother Ahmad at the Nizamiyyah, and leaving in the company of one of his pupils. Nothing in his actions before departure seems to betray a man in fear for his life.

There is no reason to doubt the accuracy and sincerity of al-Ghazali's own statement. His life and his studies confirm his statement that his primary motive was religious. He realized after much study and some scepticism that his way of life, his teaching, and his motives were not conducive to happiness in the life to come and even exposed him to the danger of hell-fire. His decision to renounce worldly glories was made while he was in this frame of mind. His fearless admission of resorting to pretence in the execution of his resolve is further proof of sincerity. For he frankly admits that he made a pretence of going on pilgrimage, whereas his intention was to go to Syria and make it his place of residence.

The autobiographical note has very little indeed to say concerning al-Ghazali's sojourn in Damascus and Jerusalem; nothing beyond mere mention of the visit to Mecca and Medina. Nor is there anything autobiographical in his discussion elsewhere of *asrar al-hajj*. What was the attraction of Syria for al-Ghazali which made it of such immediate importance? What kept him in Syria for a longer time than he seems to have allowed for

the visit to Hijaz? Why did he find something to say about his experience in Damascus and Jerusalem, but nothing at all about the thrill of the pilgrimage in the holier cities of Mecca and Medina? Did he find Damascus and Jerusalem more suitable for the life of an ascetic than Mecca and Medina? Was he really as isolated during his sojourn in Damascus and Jerusalem as the language of his autobiographical note seems to suggest? If not, with whom did he come in contact? Is there any evidence of his being influenced by a particular Syrian scholar or ascetic?

It is of course difficult to give final answers to all these questions. But I am going to suggest some answers. Al-Ghazali does not mention many names in his autobiographical account. He wrote it when he was over fifty, or some three years before his death. By then he was very famous, and was more preoccupied with ideas than personalities. Hence we must search for external evidence in references to his encounter in Damascus with a little-known mystic called Abu'l Fath Nasr b. Ibrahim al-Maqdisi an-Nabulusi.

Let us introduce Abu'l Fath first. When he died on Muharram, 490 a.h. aged over eighty, Shaikh Nasr was recognized as the leading scholar of the Shafi'i school in Syria. He spent the last ten years of his life in the city of Damascus, yuhaddithu wa-yufti wa-yudarrisu. He taught gratuitously and refused to accept any gifts. He led a life of extreme austerity and asceticism. All the biographical notes describe him as az-zahid. Legend has it that he kept alive on one loaf of bread a day baked in the corner of his brazier. It was made from the produce of a piece of land belonging to him in Nabulus. Clearly it was not the city of Nabulus, but somewhere in the neighbourhood. Yaqut's statement that Shaikh Nasr hailed from Tarabulus (Tripoli) is untenable. So far as I know, Yaqut is the only author who makes such a statement. Shaikh Nasr's ownership of land in the neighbourhood of Nabulus makes it unlikely that Tripoli was the home of his ancestors. I suggest Yaqut or copyists may have encountered Tubas, a village about ten miles north-east of Nabulus, and were puzzled by it, and then decided to read Tarabulus. In Arabic script the two place names can easily be confused.

Shaikh Nasr received a traditional Islamic education at Jerusalem and Gaza in his native Palestine, and then in, among other places, Tyre and Damascus. Later on he himself taught in Jerusalem and Tyre and finally in Damascus. Both Subki and Yaqut quote a story that when Taj ad-Daulah Tutush b. Alp Arslan passed through Damascus he visited Shaikh Nasr but the latter did not rise to greet him. Tutush asked the Shaikh what money at the disposal of the sultan was the most lawful, and the Shaikh replied that it was the income from jizyah. Later on, Tutush sent a sum of money to Shaikh Nasr with a message: 'This is from the income of jizyah; distribute it among your

followers. But the Shaikh returned the money with a counter message: 'We do not need it.'

Another legend about Shaikh Nasr has a closer connexion with al- Ghazali. An unnamed learned man is reported to have said: 'I was for some time in the company of Imam al-Haramain Abu'l Ma'ali al- Juwaini in Khurasan, then I went to Iraq and joined the circle of Abu Ishaq ash-Shirazi. I found his system better than that of Abu'l Ma'ali. Finally I went to Syria and met the jiqih Abu'l Fath. I found his system better than their systems.' Now, al-Juwaini was al-Ghazali's teacher and ash-Shirazi was his predecessor as chief mudarris at the Nizamiyyah of Baghdad.

Yet another more significant legend has it that al-Ghazali sought to meet Shaikh Nasr, but that he arrived in Damascus on the very day of the Shaikh's death. Clad in the garb of a mystic he sat in the place usually occupied by Shaikh Nasr in the Umayyad mosque. When some pupils gathered round him he inquired 'Where is Shaikh Nasr?' They told him of his death and that he named as successor a non- Arab (ajami) who answered to his description. Subki found no confirmation of this story, but that does not discredit it in its entirety.

Early in 490 al-Ghazali returned to Damascus from the pilgrimage to find the Shaikh was dead, and this fact may have contributed to his decision to leave. It is reported that he named as his successor in Damascus one of the two favourite pupils of the Shaikh, Jamal al-Islam Abu'l Hasan as-Salami, who was also al-Ghazali's pupil.

Thus tradition links the two mystics and strengthens the link through their common pupils. Al-Ghazali himself was young enough to be Shaikh Nasr's pupil. The piety, asceticism, and learning of the old man seem to have attracted the comparatively young al-Ghazali. But whatever inspiration the latter derived from the former it is safe to assume that it was primarily concerned with mystical experience and hadith . Shaikh Nasr was noted as a zdhid' faqih , and muhaddith. Now to judge by the first part of the Ihya , al-Ghazali did not entertain a very high opinion of those of his contemporaries who studied only jiqh , but was himself positively converted to zuhd , as a way of life, and by all accounts was not yet well versed in hadith .

Of the writers who state plainly that al-Ghazali did learn from Shaikh Nasr mention may be made of three. Ibn Shuhbah says that 'when al-Ghazali visited Damascus he met Shaikh Nasr and benefited from him.' Then immediately after reproducing the story of the comparison with Juwaini and Shirazi, the author of Shadhrat adh-Dhahab states: 'When al-Ghazali came to Damascus he met [Shaikh Nasr] and learnt from him.' The same statement, couched in the same words, is made later by Mujir ud-Din.

These reports are so similar that they may not be independent. But Murtada has no hesitation in accepting them and listing Shaikh Nasr among al-Ghazali's teachers in hadith. That is precisely the subject in which al-Ghazali's knowledge was never universally acknowledged, so much so that Subki fills thirty-five pages with traditions of questionable isnad and yet cited by al-Ghazali in the *Ihya*'

As stated above, al-Ghazali himself does not mention the encounter with Shaikh Nasr. His succinct words concerning the experience in Damascus and Jerusalem may, however, be supplemented. Under the year 488 a.h., Ibn al-Athir writes: 'And in this year the Imam Abu Hamid al-Ghazali went to Syria and visited Jerusalem. He abandoned teaching at the Nizamiyyah, placed his brother as his deputy [in it], and became an ascetic wearing rough clothes and eating mean food. During this journey he composed *Ihya 'Ulum ad-Din* which many people heard from him in Damascus. He returned to Baghdad after performing the pilgrimage in the following year, and proceeded to Khurasan.'

It was too late for al-Ghazali to perform the pilgrimage in 488 since he left Baghdad in Dhu'l Qa'dah. His immediate objective was clearly Syria, not Hijaz, as he himself says. That he performed the pilgrimage in 489 and that, as shown above, he returned to Baghdad the following year is, despite reports to the contrary, fairly authenticated. The period of his contact with Shaikh Nasr in Damascus must therefore be counted in months, since the latter died in Muharram 490.

It has been stated that Shaikh Nasr and al-Ghazali had a few pupils in common. One of them was Abu Bakr b. al-f Arabi. Adh-Dhahabi says of him: 'He was born in 468, travelled with his father in 485, and visited Syria and heard from (sami'a min) al-Faqih Nasr al-Maqdisi ... and from Ibn Talhah an-Na'ili in Baghdad ... and from al-Khal'i in Egypt, and I learned from (tafaqqaha 'ala) al-Ghazali. . . It is not stated where, but Ibn al-'Arabi has told us it was in Baghdad. Did he learn also from al-Ghazali in Damascus at the same time as learning from Shaikh Nasr?

Apart from the probable contact with Shaikh Nasr, what was the tangible outcome of al-Ghazali's sojourn in Syria? The language of Ibn al-Athir seems to suggest that the whole of the *Ihya* ' 'was written during that period. There is very little evidence to support this deduction. Ibn al-f Arabi's testimony is not as categorical as that of Ibn al-Athir. From Ibn al-'Arabi we may gather that portions of a proposed book with the title of *Ihya* were expounded by the author.

There is, however, conclusive internal evidence that at least one tract in al-Ghazali's magnum opus was composed not in Damascus, but in Jerusalem, and that the tract was read to the people of that city. That al-Ghazali took the opportunity of his disengagement to write, as well as meditate and worship, may be safely assumed. It seems, however, that some of this writing was done at Jerusalem and some at Damascus, if not also in Mecca and Medina. Like Ibn al 'Arabi, Mujir 'ud-Din is also less categorical than Ibn al-Athir. He names al-Ghazali among 'notable followers [of the Prophet], learned men and ascetics who entered Jerusalem' and states: 'He settled in Damascus and then moved to Jerusalem, persevering in his worship and obedience of God, and in his visits to holy] places and great centres. He began the writing of his famous work in Jerusalem; it is said that he wrote there *Ihya' 'ulum ad-Din*. He lived in the *zawiyah* over Bab-ar-Rahmah, hitherto known as an-Nasiriyyah . But [since al-Ghazali's stay in it] it was called al-Ghazaliyyah after him. . . .'

Elsewhere Mujir 'ud-Din describes the Nasiriyyah as a madrasah, Here Shaikh Nasr lived and taught for some time before finally settling in Damascus. It was customary to call such an institution after one of its famous teachers. That al-Ghazali came to live, meditate, write, and teach at the Nasiriyyah while in Jerusalem is yet another clue to his connexion with Shaikh Nasr. It is conceivable that the Shaikh's reputation, if not his personal advice, prompted al-Ghazali to choose the Nasiriyyah from among other charitable institutions in Jerusalem for his residence. Indeed the names of al-Ghazali and Shaikh Nasr are associated with yet another madrasah or *zawiyah*. While in Damascus, al-Ghazali made his residence in another such institution in the north-west corner of the Umayyad Mosque. This institution too is known both as the Nasiriyyah and Ghazaliyyah, but Shaikh Nasr was the first to teach (*darrasa*) in it.

Al-Ghazali specifically mentions his residence in Jerusalem in the *Ihya'* In concluding the discussion of the manner of gradual guidance concerning belief, he writes: 'We consider this amount of explanation of the creed sufficient for the [uninstructed] public, who need not be burdened with the duty (*la yukallafuna*) of knowing more than this in the first instance. But should it be necessary on account of confusion arising from the spread of heresy, they must be given glimpses (*lawam''*) of [more advanced explanation of] the creed, in brief and without profundity. Let us therefore mention in this book those glimpses, and let us be satisfied therefrom with what we have written to the people of Jerusalem, and called it *ar-Risalah al-Qudsiyyah ji Qawa'id al 'Aqa'id* .'

By content and method of treatment the *Risalah* bears the marks of being a complete composition on its own. It begins with the *basmalah* and the discussion is prefaced with a lengthy form of prayer usually reserved for beginning independent compositions,

books or tracts Furthermore the Risalah is elsewhere in the Ihya mentioned by al Ghazali as Kitab ar-Risalah al-Qudsiyyah . s As suggested above, al-Ghazali did not write all his great work either in Damascus or in Jerusalem or in any other single place. The available evidence justifies the conclusion that he began drafting parts of it during his sojourn in Syria, and that on small section of the work, the said Risalah , was completed in Jerusalem.

A manuscript of the Risalah dated 779 a.h. and preserved in Daral-Kutub, Cairo has a note by a scribe on the title-page which reads . by al-Ghazali . . . which he wrote as a separate tract for the people in Jerusalem and later incorporated in Kitab Qawa'id al-Aqaid which form the second part of the Ihya \ ‘ A colophon, by another hand, put it in other words: ‘And he (i.e. al-Ghazali) inished writing it at the Aqsa Mosque at the request of its people.

A similar statement is supposed to come from al-Ghazali himself in a manuscript of a portion of the Ihya ‘ dated 1160 a.h., to be mentioned presently. In this manuscript the text of the Risalah concludes with this sentence: ‘and I completed its composition (tasnijihi) in the Aqsa Mosque, in answer to the request of its people (< ahlihi).’ In the margin of the page, and in the same hand, another version of the sentence is written: ‘and I completed [the writing of] ar-Risalah al-Qudsiyyah , which I included in this section, in the Aqsa Mosque in answer to the request of its people.’

The text of the Risalah has been edited on the basis of three manuscripts and two printed texts. Two of the manuscripts are portions of the Ihya’, the one dated 610 a.h. (No. 26574) and the other 1160 a.h. (No. 45818), and both are preserved at the Library of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. The third manuscript is of the Risalah itself; it is dated 779 a.h. and is preserved at Dar al-Kutub, Cairo (Majam’ No. 66). The printed texts used are those of the Ihya ’ (Cairo, 1334 a.h.) and Murtada’s commentary thereon (Cairo, 1311 A.H.).

Needless to say that, even allowing for inevitable flourishes by pious or reckless copyists, for the usual orthographical defects, and for the grammatical mistakes of scribes, the manuscripts still do not agree with one another, nor do they always agree with the printed text, nor again do these agree with one another. As my edited text, translation, and notes will show, the flaws are often so substantial as to affect the meaning, Furthermore there are important lacunae which only patient comparison and check can reveal. They are often whole sentences or even passages. Nor is the text of Murtada’s commentary entirely free from such defects, Indeed, it is not rare to find al-Ghazali’s text at variance with that printed in the name of his commentator.

Apart from eliminating orthographical and grammatical mistakes of copyists, modern punctuation has been introduced. Where the text of one single topic is unduly long it has been divided into paragraphs. The numbers of pages in MS. 26574 (dated 610 a.h.) are shown in the text inside square brackets. The numbers shown in the left-hand margin are the corresponding pages in the first volume of the 1334 Cairo edition of the *Ihya*. Words, phrases, or sentences in square brackets may indicate either lacunae in one or other of the texts used, or an alternative reading preferred by the editor. In both cases the significance of the change is made apparent in the translation and is often explained in footnotes.

The *Risalah* is written in a style peculiar to theologians: austere condensed, and allusive. Although complicated theological question need not be written in involved language, the fact that this tract was intended for beginners, even for the young, does not seem to have influenced its author towards simplifying his style and language. For it is often particularly obscure and deficient in *bayān* compared to the prose of its time. Thus its simple meaning is often concealed beneath pedestrian prose in which at times little respect is paid to grammar. Its chief defect on this score is the use or misuse of the pronoun, apart from its general weakness in style.

From the days of al-Ghazali down to our own times, the *Risalah* was considered either as a separate composition or as an integral part of the first quarter of the *Ihya*. We have shown that the authority for this statement is al-Ghazali himself. Actually several sections in his major work can stand, and have in fact been made to stand, on their own as separate tracts. His system is logical, dividing each subject into clearly marked and numbered sections and sub-sections, and beginning each section with the *basmalah* and ending it with a prayer.

In the list of al-Ghazali's works given by Subki the *Risalah* is cited as an independent work. It is also cited as an independent work by Haj Khalifa, but he adds that it was incorporated in the *Ihya* and quotes its beginning. There are several manuscript copies of the *Risalah* in public libraries in the East and the West.

The importance of the subject of the *Risalah* is readily appreciated from the words of Subki. He wrote: I have not seen by him (i.e. al-Ghazali) work on the fundamentals of religion (*usul ad-din*) despite great search unless it is *Qawaid al 'Aqaid* . . . [which with the *Risalah* forms part of the *Ihya*] But I have not seen a separate work according to the method of scholastics (*mutakallimun*).

But the method of the *Risalah* is largely that of the post-Ash'ari scholastic. Its main purpose is to uphold Sunni orthodoxy against the innovation (*bid'ah*) of the Mu'tazilah;

it does not seem to be greatly concerned with the philosophers. While it adopts syllogism in argument its author presupposes that his adversary accepts the authority of the Qur'an. Most of the arguments rest on its authority and that of prophetic tradition and only partly on logical deduction. Although in his exposition of the fundamentals al-Ghazali makes frequent appeal to reason ('aql), his authority is more often the revelation, and the final section of the tract is almost entirely formulated on the basis of oral tradition.

PART II

الرسالة القدسية

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم . الحمد لله الذي ميز عصابة السنة بأنوار اليقين ، وآثراً رهط الحق بالهداية الى دعائم الدين ، وجنبهم زيغ الزائغين وضلال الملحدين ، ووفقهم للاقتداء بسيد المرسلين ، وسددهم للتأسي بصحبة الأكرمين ، ويسر لهم اقتفاء آثار السلف الصالحين ، حتى اعتصموا من مقتضيات العقول بالحبل المتين ، ومن سير الأولين وعقائدهم بالمنهج المبين ، فجمعوا في القبول بين نتائج العقول وقضايا الشرع المنقول ، وتحققوا ان النطق بما تعبدوا به ، من قول لا اله الا الله محمد رسول الله ، ليس له طائل ومحصول ، ان لم تتحقق الاحاطة بما تدور عليه هذه الشهادة من الأقطاب والأصول ، وعرفوا ان كلمتي الشهادة على ايجازهما تتضمنان اثبات ذات الاله واثبات صفاته واثبات افعاله واثبات صدق الرسول ، وعلموا ان بناء الايمان على هذه الأركان وهي أربعة ، ويدور كل ركن على عشرة أصول .

الركن الأول في معرفة ذات الله [تعالى]^٢ ومداره على عشرة اصول ، وهي العلم بوجود الله وقدمه وبقائه ، وانه ليس بجوهر ولا جسم ولا عرض ، وانه سبحانه ليس مختصاً بجهة ولا مستقراً على مكان ، وانه يرى^٣ وانه واحد .

الركن الثاني في صفاته ويشتمل على عشرة اصول ، وهي العلم بكونه حيا عالما قادرا مريدا سميعا بصيرا متكلماً ، منزها عن حلول الحوادث ، وانه قديم الكلام [٩٠ ب] والعلم والارادة .

الركن الثالث في افعاله تعالى ومداره على عشرة اصول ، وهي ان افعال العباد مخلوقة لله ، وانه مكتسبة للعباد ، وانه مرادة لله ، وانه متفضل بالخلق [والا ختراع]^٤ ، وان له تكليف ما لا يطاق ، وله ايلام البرئ ، ولا يجب عليه رعاية الأصلح ، وانه لا واجب الا بالشرع ، وأن بَعَثَهُ الأنبياء جائز ، وان نبوة نبينا محمد صلى الله عليه وسلم ثابتة مؤيدة بالمعجزات .

الركن الرابع في السمعيات [ومداره على عشرة اصول]^٥ ، وهي اثبات الحشر [والنشر]^٥ ، وعذاب القبر ، وسؤال منكر ونكير ، والميزان والصراط ، وخلق الجنة والنار ، واحكام الامامة ، [وان فضل الصحابة على حسب ترتيبهم ، وشروط الامامة] .^٥

١ أقر بحسب ا ٢ في كل النسخ إلا ٣ مري بحسب ا و ج ٤ بحسب ب و د
٥ مفقود من ا

الركن الأول من اركان الايمان معرفة ذات الله تعالى ومداره على عشرة اصول

الأصل الأول: معرفة وجوده تعالى . وأول ما يستضاء به من الانوار، [ويُسَلَك] ^١ من طرق الاعتبار، ما أرشد اليه القرآن، فليس بعد بيان الله بيان . وقد قال تعالى : **أَلَمْ نَجْعَلِ الْأَرْضَ مِهَادًا، وَالْجِبَالَ أَوْتَادًا، وَخَلَقْنَاكُمْ أَزْوَاجًا، وَجَعَلْنَا نَوْمَكُمْ سُبَاتًا، وَجَعَلْنَا اللَّيْلَ لِبَاسًا، وَجَعَلْنَا النَّهَارَ مَعَاشًا، وَبَنَيْنَا فَوْقَكُمْ سَبْعًا شِدَادًا، وَجَعَلْنَا سِرَاجًا وَهَّاجًا، وَأَنْزَلْنَا مِنَ الْمُعْصِرَاتِ مَاءً ثَجَّاجًا، لِنُخْرِجَ بِهِ حَبًّا وَنَبَاتًا، وَجَنَّاتٍ أَلْفَافًا.** وقال تعالى: **إِنَّ فِي خَلْقِ السَّمَوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ وَاخْتِلَافِ اللَّيْلِ وَالنَّهَارِ وَالْفَلَكَ الَّتِي تَجْرِي فِي الْبَحْرِ بِمَا يَنْفَع النَّاسَ وَمَا أَنْزَلَ اللَّهُ مِنَ السَّمَاءِ مِنْ مَاءٍ فَأَحْيَى بِهِ الْأَرْضَ بَعْدَ مَوْتِهَا وَبَثَّ فِيهَا مِنْ كُلِّ دَابَّةٍ وَتَصْرِيفِ الرِّيَّاحِ وَالسَّحَابِ الْمُسَخَّرِ بَيْنَ السَّمَاءِ وَالْأَرْضِ لَآيَاتٍ لِقَوْمٍ يَعْقِلُونَ.** وقال تعالى : **الْم تَرَوْنَ كَيْفَ خَلَقَ اللَّهُ سَبْعَ سَمَوَاتٍ طِبَاقًا، وَجَعَلَ الْقَمَرَ فِيهِنَّ نُورًا وَجَعَلَ الشَّمْسُ سِرَاجًا، وَاللَّهُ ائْتَبَكُمْ مِنَ الْأَرْضِ نَبَاتًا، ثُمَّ يَعِيدُكُمْ فِيهَا وَيَخْرِجُكُمْ أَخْرَاجًا.** وقال تعالى : **اَفَرَأَيْتُمْ مَا تُمْنُونَ، أَأَنْتُمْ تَخْلُقُونَهُ أَمْ نَحْنُ الْخَالِقُونَ.** الى قوله نحن جعلناها تذكرة ومتاعاً للمقوين .

وليس يخفى على من معه أدنى مسكة [من عقل] ^٢ إذا [٩١ أ] تأمل بأدنى فكره مضمون هذه الآيات، وادار نظره على عجائب خلق [الله في] ^٢ الأرض والسماوات، وبدائع فطرة الحيوان والنبات، ان هذا الأمر العجيب والترتيب المحكم لا يستغني عن صانع يديره وفاعل يحكمه ويقدره . بل تَكَادُ فطرة النفوس تشهد بكونها مقهورة تحت تسخيريه ومصرفه بمقتضى تديره . ولذلك قال تعالى : **إِنِّي اللَّهُ شَكَ فَاطِرَ السَّمَوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ، وَلِهَذَا بَعَثَ الْأَنْبِيَاءَ كُلَّهُمْ لِدَعْوَةِ الْخَلْقِ إِلَى التَّوْحِيدِ، لِيَقُولُوا لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ،** ^{٩٤} **وَمَا أَمْرُوا أَن يَقُولُوا لَنَا إِلَهٌ وَلِلْعَالَمِ إِلَهٌ،** فان ذلك كان مجبولا في فطرة عقولهم من مبدأ نشوءهم وفي عنفوان ستهم . ولذلك قال تعالى : **وَلَثْنُ سَأَلْتُمْ مِنْ خَلْقِ السَّمَوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ لِيَقُولَنَّهُ اللَّهُ.** وقال تعالى : **فَأَقِمْ وَجْهَكَ لِلدِّينِ حَنِيفًا، فِطْرَةَ اللَّهِ الَّتِي فَطَرَ النَّاسَ عَلَيْهَا، لَا تَبْدِيلَ لِخَلْقِ اللَّهِ، ذَلِكَ الدِّينُ الْقَيِّمُ.**

فاذا في فطرة الانسان وشواهد القرآن ما يغني عن إقامة البرهان، ولكننا على سبيل الاستظهار والاقتداء بالعلماء النظار نقول : من بداية العقول ان الحادث لا يستغني في حدوثه عن سبب يحدثه، والعالم حادث فاذا لا يستغني في حدوثه عن سبب . اما قدلنا الحادث لا يستغني عن سبب فجلي، فان كل حادث فهو مختص بوقت يجوز في العقل تقدير تقدمه وتأخره، فاخصاصه بوقته دون ما بعده وما قبله يفتقر بالضرورة الى المخصص . واما قولنا العالم حادث فبرهانه ان أجسام العالم لا تخلو عن الحركة والسكون، وهما حادثان، وما لا يخلو عن الحوادث فهو حادث .

وفي هذا البرهان ثلاث دعاوي: الأولى ان الاجسام لا تخلو عن الحركة والسكون، وهذه مدركة بالبدية والاضطرار، فلا يحتاج فيها الى تأمل [وافتكار] ^١، فان من عقل جسماً لا ساكناً ولا متحركاً كان لمتن الجهل ركباً وعن نهج العقل ناكباً. والثانية قولنا انهما حادثان، ويدل على ذلك تعاقبهما ووجود البعض [٩١ ب] منهما بعد البعض، وذلك مشاهد في جميع الاجسام [ما شوهد منها] ^٢ وما لم يشاهد، فما من ساكن الا والعقل قاض بجواز حركته، وما من متحرك الا والعقل قاض بجواز سكونه، فالطاري منها حادث لطريانه، والسابق حادث لأنه لو ثبت قدمه لاستحال عدمه، على ما سيأتي بيانه وبرهانه في اثبات بقاء الصانع تعالى وتقدس. والثالثة قولنا ما لا يخلو عن الحوادث فهو حادث، وبرهانه انه لو لم يكن كذلك لكان قبل كل حادث حوادث لا أول لها، وما لم تنقض تلك [الحوادث] ^٣ بجملتها لا تنتهي النوبة الى وجود الحادث الحاضر في الحال، وانقضاء ما لا نهاية له محال.

ولأنه لو كان للفلك دورات لا نهاية لها لكان لا يخلو عددها من أن يكون شفعاً أو وترّاً، أو شفعاً ووترّاً جميعاً، أو لا شفعاً ولا وترّاً، ومحال ان يكون شفعاً ووترّاً جميعاً، اولا شفعاً ولا وترّاً جميعاً، فان ذلك جمع بين النفي والاثبات، اذ في اثبات احدهما نفي الآخر، وفي نفي احدهما اثبات الآخر. ومحال ان يكون شفعاً لأن الشفع يصير وترّاً بزيادة واحد، فكيف يعوز ما لا نهاية له واحد؟ ومحال ان يكون وترّاً اذ الوتر يصير شفعاً بواحد، فكيف يعوزها واحد مع انه لا نهاية لأعدادها؟ [ومحال ان يكون لا شفعاً ولا وترّاً اذ له نهاية]. ^٣ فيحصل من هذا ان العالم لا يخلو عن الحوادث، فهو اذاً حادث. واذ ثبت حدوثه كان افتقاره الى المحدث من المدركات بالضرورة.

الأصل الثاني: العلم بان الباري تعالى قديم لم يزل، أزلي ليس لوجوده أول، بل هو أول كل شيء، وقبل كل حي وميت. وبرهانه أنه لو كان حادثاً ولم يكن قديماً لافتقر هو ايضا الى محدث وافترق محدثه الى محدث، ويتسلسل ذلك الى غير نهاية، وما تسلسل لم يتحصل أو ينتهي الى محدث قديم هو الأول، وذلك هو المطلوب الذي سميناه صانع العالم وباريه ومحدثه ومبديه.

الأصل الثالث: العلم بانه [تعالى] مع انه كونه أزلياً أبدياً، ليس [٩٢ أ] لوجوده آخر، فهو الأول والآخر والظاهر والباطن، لأن ما ثبت قدمه استحال عدمه. وبرهانه انه لو انعدم لكان لا يخلو إما ان ينعدم بنفسه أو بمعدم يضاده. ولو جاز أن ينعدم شيء يتصور دوامه بنفسه لجاز ان يوجد شيء بنفسه، فكما يحتاج طريان الوجود الى سبب، فكذا يحتاج طريان العدم الى سبب، وباطل ان ينعدم بمعدم يضاده، لأن ذلك المعدم لو كان قديماً لما تصور وجوده معه. وقد ظهر بالأصلين السابقين وجوده وقدمه، فكيف كان وجوده في القدم ومعه ضده؟ وان كان الضد المعدم حادثاً كان

^٣ ما بين القوسين موجود في د فقط

^٢ بحسب د فقط

^١ انفكك في ا

محالاً، اذ ليس الحادث في مضادته للقديم حتى يقطع وجوده بأولى من القديم في مضادته للحادث حتى يدفع وجوده، بل الدفع أهون من القطع، والقديم اقوى من الحادث.

الأصل الرابع: العلم بأنه ليس بجوهر يتحيز، بل يتعالى ويتقدس عن مناسبة الحيز. وبرهانه ان كل جوهر متحيز فهو مختص بحيزه، ولا يخلو من أن يكون ساكناً فيه أو متحركاً عنه، فلا يخلو عن الحركة والسكون وهما حادثان، ومالا يخلو عن الحوادث فهو حادث. ولو تصور جوهر متحيز قديم لكان يعقل قدم جواهر العالم. فان سماه مُسمَّ جوهرًا ولم يرد به المتحيز كان مخطئاً | من حيث اللفظ لامن حيث ٩٥ المعنى.

الأصل الخامس: العلم بأنه تعالى ليس بجسم مؤلف من جواهر، اذ الجسم عبارة عن المؤتلف من الجواهر. واذا بطل كونه جوهرًا مخصوصًا بحيز بطل كونه جسمًا، لأن كل جسم مختص بحيز ومركب من جوهر وجوهر، ويستحيل خلوه عن الافتراق والاجتماع والحركة والسكون والهيئة والمقدار، وهذه سمات الحدوث. ولوجازان يعتقد ان صانع العالم جسم لجاز ان يعتقد الالهية للشمس والقمر او لشيء آخر من اقسام الاجسام. [٩٢ ب] فان تجاسر متجاسر على تسميته تعالى جسمًا من غير ارادة التأليف من الجواهر، كان ذلك غلطاً في الاسم مع الاصابة في نفي معنى الجسم.

الأصل السادس: العلم بأنه تعالى ليس بعرض قائم بجسم أو حال في محل، لأن العرض ما يحل في الجسم، وكل جسم فهو حادث ويكون محدثه موجوداً قبله، فكيف يكون حالاً في الجسم وقد كان موجوداً في الأزل وحده وبامعه غيره، ثم احدث الاجسام والأعراض بعده؟ ولانه عالم قادر مريد خالق كما سيأتي [بيانها]، وهذه الأوصاف تستحيل على الأعراض، بل لا تعقل الا لموجود قائم بنفسه مستقل بذاته. وقد تحصل من هذه الأوصاف انه موجود قائم بنفسه، ليس بجوهر ولا جسم ولا عرض، فان العالم كله جواهر واعراض واجسام. فاذا لا يشبه شيئاً ولا يشبهه شيء، بل هو الحي القيوم، ليس كمثل شيء. وأنى يشبه المخلوق خالقه، والمقدر المصور مقدره ومصدره، والاجسام والاعراض كلها من خلقه وصنعه، فاستحال القضاء عليها بمماثلته ومشابھته.

الأصل السابع: العلم بان الله تعالى منزه الذات عن الاختصاص بالجهات، فان الجهة إما فوق وإما اسفل، وإما يمين وإما شمال، أو قدام أو خلف. وهذه الجهات هو الذي خلقها واحداثها بواسطة خلق الانسان، اذ خلق له طرفين احدهما يعتمد على الأرض ويسمى رجلاً والآخر يقابله ويسمى رأساً، فحدث اسم الفوق لما يلي جهة الرأس، واسم السفلى لما يلي جهة الأرض. حتى ان النملة التي تدب منكسة تحت

السقف تنقلب جهة الفوق في حقها تحتاً، وإن كانت في حقنا فوقاً. وخلق للانسان اليدين وأحدهما اقوى من الاخرى في الغالب، فحدث اسم اليمين للاقوى والشمال لما يقابله، فتسمى الجهة التي تلي اليمين يميناً والاخرى شمالاً. وخلق له جانبين يبصر من احدهما ويتحرك اليه، فحدث اسم [٩٣ أ] القدام للجهة التي يتقدم اليها بالحركة واسم الخلف لما يقابله.

فالجهات حادثة بحدوث الانسان، ولو لم يخلق الانسان بهذه الخلقة، بل خلق مستديراً كالكرة لم يكن لهذه الجهات وجود البتة. فكيف كان في الأزل مختصاً بجهة والجهة حادثة؟ أو كيف صار [مختصاً] بجهة بعد ان لم يكن؟ [أبأن] خلق العالم تحته؟ وتعالى عن أن يكون له تحت، اذ تعالى عن ان يكون له رجل، فالتحت عبارة عما يلي جهة الرجل. فكل ذلك مما يستحيل في العقل، لان المعقول من كونه [مختصاً] بجهة انه مختص بالحيز اختصاص الجوهر او مختص بالجوهر اختصاص العرض. وقد ظهر استحالة كونه جوهرًا وعرضًا، فاستحال كونه مختصاً بجهة. وإن اريد بالجهة غير هذين المعنيين كان غلطاً في الاسم مع المساعدة على المعنى، ولأنه لو كان فوق العالم لكان محاذياً له، وكل محاذ لجسم فاما ان يكون مثله أو اصغر [منه] أو اكبر، وكل ذلك تقدير يحوج [بالضرورة] ٢ الى مقدر، ويتعالى عنه الخالق المدبر. فأما رفع الايدي عند السؤال الى جهة السماء فهو لأنها قبلة الدعاء، وفيه ايضاً اشارة الى ماهو وصف للمدعو من الجلال والكبرياء، تنبيهها بقصد جهة العلو على صفة المجد والعلاء، فانه تعالى فوق كل موجود بالقهر والاستيلاء.

الأصل الثامن: العلم بانه تعالى مستوٍ على عرشه بالمعنى الذي اراده تعالى بالاستواء، وهو الذي لا ينافي وصف الكبرياء، ولا تتطرق اليه سمات الحدث والفناء، وهو الذي أريد بالاستواء الى السماء حيث قال في القرآن: ثم استوى الى السماء وهي دخان، وليس ذلك الا بطريق القهر والاستيلاء، كما قال الشاعر: قد استوى بشر على العراق، من غير سيف ودم مهباق. واضطر اهل الحق الى هذا التأويل كما اضطر اهل الباطن ٣ الى تأويل قوله تعالى: وهو معكم أينما كنتم، اذ حمل [٩٣ ب] ا بالاتفاق على الاحاطة والعلم، وحمل قوله صلى الله عليه وسلم: قلب المؤمن بين اصبعين من أصابع الرحمن على القدرة والقهر، وحمل قوله صلى الله عليه وسلم: الحجر الأسود يمين الله في أرضه على التشريف والاكرام، لأنه لو ترك على ظاهره للزم منه المحال. فكذا الاستواء لو ترك على الاستقرار والتمكن للزم منه كون المتمكن جسماً مماساً للعرش، اما مثله أو اكبر [منه] أو اصغر، وذلك محال، وما يؤدي الى المحال فهو محال.

الأصل التاسع: العلم بأنه تعالى مع كونه منزهاً عن الصور والاقدار، مقدساً عن

٣ "أهل الباطل" في ب

٢ كما في ب

١ كما في ب و ج

الجهات والأقطار، مرئى بالأعين والابصار في الدار الآخرة، لقوله تعالى: وجوه يومئذ ناضرة، الى ربها ناظرة، ولا يرى في [دار] الدنيا تصديقاً لقوله تعالى: لا تدركه الابصار وهو يدرك الابصار، ولقوله تعالى في خطاب موسى [عليه السلام]: لن تراني! وليت شعري كيف عرف المعتزلي من صفة رب الارباب ما جهله موسى؟ او كيف سأل موسى الرؤية مع كونها محالاً؟ ولعل الجهل بذوي البدع والاهواء من الجهلة الأغبياء أولى من الجهل بالانبياء! واما وجه اجراء آية الرؤية على الظاهر [فهو] أنه غير مؤد الى المحال، فان الرؤية نوع كشف وعلم، الا انه اتم واوضح من العلم. فاذا جاز تعلق العلم به وليس في جهة، جاز تعلق الروية [به وليس في جهة].^٢ وكما يجوز ان يرى الله الخلق وليس في مقابلتهم، جاز ان يراه الخلق من غير مقابلة. وكما جاز ان يعلم من غير كيفية وصورة، جاز ان يرى كذلك من غير كيفية وصورة. الأصل العاشر: العلم بان الله [عز وجل] واحد لا شريك له، فرد لا ند له، انفرد بالخلق والابداع، واستبد بالايجاد والاختراع، لا مثل له يساهمه ويساويه، ولا ضد له فينازعه ويناويه. وبرهانه قوله تعالى: لو كان فيهما آلهة الا الله لفسدتا. ويبانه انهما لو كانا اثنين واراد احدهما امراً، فالثاني ان كان مضطراً الى مساعدته [٩٤ أ] كان هذا الثاني مقهوراً عاجراً ولم يكن آلهة قادراً، وان كان قادراً على مخالفته ومدافعته كان الثاني قويا قاهراً والاول ضعيفاً قاصراً، فلم يكن آلهة قادراً.

الركن الثاني [من اركان الايمان] العلم بصفات الله تعالى ومداره على عشرة أصول

الأصل الأول: العلم بان صانع العالم قادر، وانه تعالى في قوله: وهو على كل شيء قدير، صادق، لان العالم محكم في صنعه مرتب في خلقه. ومن رأى ثوبا من ديباج حسن النسج والتأليف، متناسب التطريز والتطريف، ثم توهم صدور نسجه من ميت لا استطاعة له، او انسان لا قدرة له، كان متخلعاً عن غريزة العقل، ومنخرطاً في سلك أهل الغباوة والجهل.

الأصل الثاني: العلم بأنه تعالى عالم بجميع الموجودات ومحيط بكل المخلوقات، لا يعزب عن علمه مثقال ذرة في الأرض والسماء، صادق في قوله: وهو بكل شيء عليم، ومرشد الى صدقه بقوله: ألا يعلم من خلق وهو اللطيف الخبير؟ ارشدك الى الاستدلال بالخلق على العلم، لانك لا تستريب في دلالة الخلق اللطيف والصنع المزين بالترتيب، ولو في الشيء الحقير الطفيف، على علم الصانع بكيفية الترتيب والترصيف. لما ذكره الله تعالى هو المنتهى في الهداية والتعريف.

الأصل الثالث : العلم بكونه حياً ، فإن من ثبت علمه وقدرته ثبت بالضرورة حياته ، ولو تصوّر قادر عالم فاعل مدبر دون ان يكون حياً ، لجاز ان يشك في حياة الحيوانات عند ترددها في الحركات والسكنات ، بل في حياة ارباب الحرف والصناعات ، وذلك انغماس في غمرة الجهالات .

الأصل الرابع : العلم بكونه تعالى مريدا لا فعالة ، فلا موجود الا وهو مستند الى مشيئته ، وصادر على ارادته ، فهو المبدي المعيد الفاعل لما يريد . وكيف لا يكون مريدا وكل فعل صدر منه أمكن أن يصدر [٩٤ ب] منه ضده ، وما لا ضد له امكن ان يصدر منه ذلك بعينه قبله او بعده . والقدرة تناسب الضدين والوقتین مناسبة واحدة ، فلا بد من ارادة صارفة للقدرة الى أحد المقدورين . ولو أغنى العلم عن الارادة في تخصيص المعلوم ، حتى يقال انما وجد في الوقت الذي سبق العلم بوجوده ، لجاز ان يغني عن القدرة ، حتى يقال وجد بغير قدرة لأنه سبق العلم بوجوده .

الأصل الخامس : العلم بانه تعالى سميع بصير ، لا يعزب عن رؤيته هواجس الضمير وخفايا الوهم والتفكير ، ولا يشذ عن سمعه صوت دبيب النملة السوداء في الليلة الظلماء على الصخرة الصماء . وكيف لا يكون سميعا بصيرا ، والسمع والبصر كمال لا محالة وليس بنقص ؟ فكيف يكون المخلوق اكمل من الخالق ، والمصنوع اشرف وأتم من الصانع ؟ | وكيف تعادل القسمة مهما وقع النقص في [الخالق] ^١ والكمال في خلقه وصنعتة ؟ أو كيف تستقيم حجة ابراهيم عليه السلام على ابيه ، اذ كان يعبد الأصنام جهلا وغيا فقال له : لِمَ تعبد ما لا يسمع ولا يبصر ولا يغني عنك شيئا ، فلو انقلب عليه ذلك في معبوده لاصبحت حجتة داحضة ودلالته ساقطة ، ولم يصدق قوله تعالى : وتلك حجتنا آتيناها ابراهيم على قومه ؟ وكما عقل كونه فاعلا بلا جارحة ، وعالما بلا قلب ودماغ ، فليعقل كونه بصيرا بلا حدقة ، وسميعا بلا أذن ، اذ لا فرق بينهما .

الأصل السادس : [العلم] بانه [تعالى] متكلم بكلام ، وهو وصف قائم بذاته ليس بحرف ولا صوت ، بل لا يشبه كلامه كلام غيره ، كما لا يشبه وجوده وجود غيره . والكلام بالحقيقة كلام النفس ، وانما الأصوات قطعت حروفا للدلالات ، كما يدل عليها تارة بالحركات والاشارات . فكيف التبس هذا على طائفة من الاغبياء ، ولم يلتبس على جهلة الشعراء ، حتى قال قائلهم : ان الكلام لفي الفؤاد وانما جعل اللسان على الفؤاد دليلا . ومن لم يَعْقِلْ [٩٥ أ] عقله ولا نَهاه نُهاه عن ان يقول لساني حادث ، ولكن ما يحدث فيه بقدرتي الحادثة قديم ، فاقطع عن عقله طمعك ، وكُف عن حظابه لسانك . ومن لم يفهم ان القديم عبارة عما ليس قبله شيء ، وان الباء قبل السين في قولك بسم الله ، فلا يكون السين المتأخر عن الباء قديما ، فنزّه

عن الالتفات إليه قلبك، فله سرٌّ في إبعاد بعض العباد، ومن يضل الله فما له من هاد.

ومن استبعد ان يسمع موسى [عليه السلام] ^١ في الدنيا كلاما ليس بصوت [ولا بحرف] ^٢، فليستكر ان يرى في الآخرة موجوداً ليس بجسم ولا لون. وإن عقل ان يرى ما ليس بلون ولا جسم ولا قدر ولا كمية، وهو الى الآن لم ير غيره، فليعقل في حاسة السمع ما عقله في حاسة البصر. وان عقل ان يكون له علم واحد هو علم بجميع الموجودات، فليعقل صفة واحدة للذات هي كلام يجمع ما دلّ عليه بالعبارات. وان عقل كون السموات السبع وكون الجنة والنار مكتوبة في ورقة صغيرة، ومحفوظة في مقدار ذرة من القلب، ومرئية في مقدار عدسة من الحدقة، من غير ان تحل ذات السموات والجنة والنار في الحدقة والورقة، فليعقل كون الكلام مقروءاً باللسنة، محفوظاً في القلوب، مكتوباً في المصاحف، من غير حلول ذات الكلام فيها، اذ لو حلت ذات الله تعالى بكتابة اسمه في الورق، لحلت ذات النار بكتابة اسمها في القرآن ولا حترق.

الأصل السابع: [العلم ب] ان كلامه القائم بذاته قديم، وكذا جميع صفاته، اذ يستحيل ان يكون محلاً للحوادث داخلاً تحت التغير، بل يجب للصفات من نعوت القدم ما يجب للذات، فلا تعتريه التغيرات ولا تحله الحادثات، بل لم يزل في قدمه موصوفاً بمحامد الصفات، ولا يزال في أبده كذلك منزها عن تغير الحالات، لان محل الحوادث لا يخلو عنها، وما لا يخلو عن الحوادث فهو [٩٥ ب] حادث. وانما ثبت نعت الحدثان للأجسام من حيث تعرضها للتغيير وتقلب الأوصاف، فكيف يكون خالقها مشاركاً لها في قبول التغيير؟ ويبتنى على هذا ان كلامه قديم قائم بذاته، وانما الحادث هي الاصوات الدالة عليه. وكما عقل قيام طلب العلم واراדתه بذات الوالد للولد قبل ان يُخلق ولده، حتى اذا خُلق ولده وعقل، وخلق الله له علماً بما في قلب ابيه من الطلب، صار مأموراً بذلك الطلب الذي قام بذات ابيه ودام وجوده الى وقت معرفة ولده، فليعقل قيام الطلب الذي دل عليه قوله [تعالى]: اخلع نعليك، بذات الله، ومصير موسى [عليه السلام] مخاطباً به بعد وجوده، اذ خلقت له معرفة بذلك الطلب وسمع لذلك الكلام القديم.

الأصل الثامن: ان علمه قديم، فلم يزل عالماً بذاته وصفاته وما يحدثه من مخلوقاته. ومنهما حدثت المخلوقات لم يحدث له علم بها، بل حصلت مكشوفة له بالعلم الأزلي. اذ لو خُلق لنا علم بقدوم زيد عند طلوع الشمس، ودام ذلك العلم تقديراً حتى طلعت الشمس، لكان قدوم زيد عند الطلوع معلوماً لنا بذلك العلم، من غير تجديد علم آخر. فهكذا ينبغي ان يفهم قدم علم الله تعالى.

الأصل التاسع: ان اراذته قديمة، وهي في القدم تعلقت باحداث الحوادث في

اوقاتها اللائقة بها على وفق سبق العلم الأزلي ، اذ لو كانت حادثة لصار محل الحوادث ، ولو حدثت في غير ذاته لم يكن هو مريدا لها ، كما لا تكون انت متحركاً بحركة ليست في ذاتك ، فكيفما قدرت فيفتقر حدوثها الى ارادة اخرى ، وكذا الارادة الاخرى تفتقر الى | اخرى ، ويتسلسل الأمر الى غير نهاية . ولوجاز أن يحدث ارادة بغير ارادة لجاز ان يحدث العالم بغير ارادة .

الأصل العاشر : ان الله تعالى عالم بعلم ، حي بحياة ، قادر بقدرة ، ومريد بارادة ، ومتكلم بكلام ، وسميع بسمع ، وبصير ببصر ، وله هذه الأوصاف من هذه الصفات القديمة ، وقول القائل [٩٦ أ] عالم بلا علم كقوله غني بلا مال وعلم بلا عالم وعالم بلا معلوم ، فان العلم والمعلوم والعالم متلازمة ، كالقتل والمقتول والقاتل ، وكما لا يتصور قاتل بلا قتل ولاقتيل ، ولا يتصور قتيل بلا قاتل ولا قتل ، فكذلك لا يتصور عالم بلا علم ، وعلم بلا معلوم ، ومعلوم بلا عالم ، بل هذه الثلاثة متلازمة في العقل لا ينفك بعض منها عن البعض . فمن جوز انفكك العالم عن العلم فليجوز انفككه عن المعلوم ، وانفكك العلم عن العالم ، اذ لا فرق بين هذه الاضافات .

الركن الثالث [من اركان الايمان] العلم بأفعال الله تعالى ومداره على عشرة أصول

الأصل الأول : العلم بان كل حادث في العالم فهو فعله وخلقه واختراعه ، لا خالق سواه ، ولا محدث الا اياه ، خلق الخلق وصنعمهم ، واوجد قدرتهم وحركتهم ، فجميع افعال عباده مخلوقة له ومتعلقة بقدرته ، تصديقاً له في قوله تعالى : [الله] ١ خالق كل شيء ، وفي قوله : والله خلقكم وما تعملون ، وفي قوله : واسروا قولكم او اجهروا به انه عليم بذات الصدور ، الا يعلم من خلق وهو اللطيف الخبير . أمر العباد بالتحرز في اقوالهم [وافعالهم] ٢ ، واسرارهم واضمارهم ، لعلمه بموارد افعالهم . واستدل على العلم بالخلق ، وكيف لا يكون خالقاً لفعل العبد وقدرته تامة لا قصور فيها ، وهي متعلقة بحركات ابدان العباد ، فالحركات متماثلة ، وتعلق القدرة بها لذاتها ، فما الذي يقصر تعلقها عن بعض الحركات دون بعض مع تماثلها ؟ أو كيف يكون الحيوان مستبداً بالاختراع ، ويصدر من العنكبوت والنحل وسائر الحيوانات من لطائف الصناعات ما يتحير فيه عقول ذوي الألباب ، فكيف انفردت هي باختراعها دون رب الأرباب ، وهي غير عالمة بتفصيل ما يصدر منها من الاكتساب ؟ هيهات ، هيهات ، ذلت المخلوقات ، وتفرّد بالملك والملكوت جبار [الارض] ٣ والسماوات .

الأصل الثاني : ان انفراد الله سبحانه باختراع حركات العباد [٩٦ ب] لا يخرجها عن كونها مقدورة للعباد على سبيل الاكتساب ، بل الله خلق القدرة والمقدور جميعاً ،

١ كما في ب والنص القرآني ٢ كما في ب ٣ ساقط من ا ووجود في ب

وخلق الاختيار والمختار. فأما القدرة فوصف للعبد وخلق للرب وليس بكسب له، وأما الحركة فخلق للرب ووصف للعبد وكسب له، فإنها خلقت مقدورة بقدرة هي وصفه، فكانت للحركة نسبة إلى صفة أخرى تسمى قدرة، فتسمى باعتبار تلك النسبة كسباً. وكيف يكون جبراً محضاً وهو بالضرورة يدرك التفرقة بين الحركة المقدورة والردة الضرورية؟ أو كيف يكون خلقاً للعبد وهو لا يحيط علماً بتفاصيل اجزاء الحركات المكتسبة واعدادها؟ وإذا بطل الطرفان لم يبق إلا الاقتصاد في الاعتقاد، وهو أنها مقدورة بقدرة الله تعالى اختراعاً، وبقدرة العبد على وجه آخر من التعلق يعبر عنه بالاكتساب. وليس من ضرورة تعلق القدرة بالمقدور أن يكون بالاختراع فقط، إذ قدرة الله في الأزل كانت متعلقة بالعالم ولم يكن الاختراع حاصلًا بها، وهي عند الاختراع متعلقة به نوعاً آخر من التعلق، فيه يظهر أن تعلق القدرة ليس مخصوصاً بحصول المقدور بها.

الأصل الثالث: أن فعل العبد وإن كان كسباً للعبد فلا يخرج عن كونه مراد الله تعالى، فلا يجري في الملك والملكوت طرفة عين، ولا فلتة خاطر، ولا فلتة ناظر، إلا بقضاء الله وقدرته وإرادته ومشيئته، فمنه الخير والشر، والنفع والضرر، والاسلام والكفر، والعرفان والنكر، والفوز والخسر، والغواية والرشد، والطاعة والعصيان، والشرك والإيمان، لا راد لقضائه، ولا معقب لحكمه، يضل مَنْ يشاء ويهدي من يشاء، لا يُسأل عما يفعل وهم يسألون. ويدل عليه من النقل قول الأمة قاطبة ما شاء الله كان، وما لم يشأ لم يكن، وقوله تعالى: لو يشاء الله لهدى الناس جميعاً، وقوله تعالى: ولو شئنا [٩٧ أ] لآتينا كل نفس هداها.

ويدل [عليه] من جهة العقل أن المعاصي والجرائم إن كان الله يكرها ولا يريد لها فأنما هي جارية على وفق إرادة إبليس لعنه الله، مع أنه عدو الله، فالجاري على وفق إرادة العدو أكثر من الجاري على وفق إرادته [تعالى]. فليت شعري كيف يستجيز المسلم أن يرد ملك الجبار ذي الجلال والإكرام إلى رتبة لو ردت إليها رئاسة زعيم ضيعة لا يستنكف منها، إذ لو كان ما يستتب لعدو الزعيم في القرية أكثر مما ٩٩ يستتب له لاستنكف من زعامته وتبرأ عن ولايته. والمعصية هي الغالبة على الخلق، وكل ذلك جار عند المبتدعة على خلاف إرادة الحق، وهذا غاية الصغف والعجز، تعالى رب الأرباب عن قول الظالمين علواً كبيراً.

ثم مهما ظهر أن أفعال العباد مخلوقة لله تعالى صح أنها مرادة له، فإن قيل فكيف ينهى عما يريد، ويأمر بما لا يريد، قلنا الأمر غير الإرادة، ولذلك إذا ضرب السيد عبده لعاتبه السلطان عليه، فاعتذر بتمرد عبده عليه، فكذب السلطان، فأراد اظهار حجته بأن يأمر عبده بفعل و[هو يريد أن] ٢ يخالفه بين يديه، فقال له: اسرج هذه الدابة تشهد من السلطان، فهو يأمره بما لا يريد امتثاله، ولو لم يكن أمراً لما كان عذره عند

السلطان مهّداً، ولو كان مريداً الامتثال لأمره لكان مريداً لهلاك نفسه، وهو محال.

الأصل الرابع: ان الله تعالى متفضل بالخلق والاختراع، ومتطول بتكليف العباد، ولم يكن الخلق والتكليف واجبا عليه. وقالت المعتزلة وجب عليه ذلك لما فيه من مصلحة العباد، وهو محال اذ هو الموجب والأمر والناهي، فكيف يتهدف لايجاب أو يتعرض للزوم وخطاب؟ والمراد بالواجب احد امرين: اما الفعل الذي في تركه ضرر إماً أجّل، كما يقال يجب على العبد ان يطيع الله [حتى لا يعذبه في الآخرة بالنار]، أو ضرر عاجل، كما يقال يجب على العطشان ان يشرب [الماء] حتى لا يموت [٩٧ ب]، واما ان يراد به الذي عدمه يؤدي الى محال، كما يقال وجود المعلوم واجب اذ عدمه يؤدي الى محال، وهو ان يصير العلم جهلاً. فان اراد الخصم بان الخلق واجب على الله بالمعنى الأول فقد عرضه للضرر، وان اراد به المعنى الثاني فهو مسلّم، اذ بعد سبق العلم لا بد من وجود المعلوم. وان اراد به معنى ثالثاً فهو غير مفهوم. وقوله يجب لمصلحة عبادته كلام فاسد، فانه اذا لم يتضرر بترك مصلحة العباد لم يكن للوجوب في حقه معنى. ثم [ان] مصلحة العباد في ان يخلقهم في الجنة، فأما ان يخلقهم في دار البلايا ويعرضهم للخطايا، تم يهدفهم لخطر العقاب وهول العرض والحساب، فما في ذلك غبطة عند ذوي الألباب.

الأصل الخامس: انه يجوز على الله سبحانه ان يكلف عبادته ما لا يطيقونه، خلافاً للمعتزلة. ولو لم يجز ذلك لاستحال سؤال دفعه، وقد سألوا ذلك فقالوا: ربنا لا تحمّلنا ما لا طاقة لنا به؛ ولأن الله تعالى أخبر نبيه [صلى الله عليه وسلم] بان اباجهل لا يصدق، ثم امره بان يصدق في جميع اقواله، وكان من جملة اقواله انه لا يصدق، فكيف يصدق في انه لا يصدق؟ وهل هذا إلا محال وجوده؟

الأصل السادس: ان الله [عز وجل] ايلام الخلق وتعذيبهم من غير جرم سابق ومن غير ثواب لاحق، خلافاً للمعتزلة، لأنه متصرف في ملكه، ولا يتصور أن يعدو تصرفه ملكه. والظلم هو عبارة عن التصرف في ملك الغير، وهو محال على الله [تعالى]، فانه لا يصادف لغيره ملكاً، حتى يكون تصرفه فيه ظلماً. ويدل على جواز ذلك وجوده، فان ذبح البهائم ايلام لما، وما صب عليها من انواع العذاب من جهة الآدميين لم يتقدمها جريمة. فان قيل ان الله تعالى يحشرها ويجازيها على ما قاسته من الآلام، ويجب ذلك عليه، فنقول: من زعم انه يجب على الله إحياء كل نملة وطئت، وكل بقعة فركت، حتى يثيبها على آلامها، فقد خرج عن الشرع والعقل، اذ [٩٨ أ] يقال [ذلك في] وصف الثواب والحشر بكونه واجبا عليه إن كان المراد به انه يتضرر بتركه وهو محال. وان اريد به غيره فقد سبق انه غير مفهوم، اذ خرج عن المعاني المذكورة للواجب.

الأصل السامع : انه [تعالى] يفعل بعباده ما يشاء ، فلا يجب عليه رعاية الأصلح لعباده ، لما ذكرناه من انه لا يجب عليه شيء ، بل لا يعقل في حقه الوجوب ، فانه لا يسأل عما يفعل وهم يسألون . وليت شعري بم يجب المعتزلي في قوله ان الاصلح واجب عليه عن مسألة نعرضها عليه . وهي ان نفرض مناظرة في الآخرة بين صبي مات مسلماً وبين بالغ مات مسلماً ، فان الله يزيد في درجات البالغ ويفضله على الصبي لأنه تعب بالايمان والطاعات بعد البلوغ ، ويجب عليه ذلك عند المعتزلي . فلو قال الصبي : يارب لم رفعت منزلته علي ؟ فيقول : لانه بلغ واجتهد في الطاعة . فيقول الصبي : انت أمتني في الصبا ، وكان يجب ان تديم حياتي حتى ابلغ فاجتهد ، فقد عدلت عن العدل في التفضل عليه بتطويل العمر دوني ، فلم فضلته ؟ فيقول الله : لأنني علمت انك لو بلغت لأشركت أو عصيت ، وكان الأصلح لك الموت في الصبا . هذا عذر المعتزلي عن الله [عزوجل .] وعند هذا ينادي الكفار من دركات لظى ويقولون : [يارب] أما علمت اننا اذا بلغنا اشركنا ، فهلاً أمتنا في الصبا ، فانا رضينا بما دون منزلة الصبي المسلم ؟ فيماذا يجاب عن ذلك ؟ | وهل يجب عند هذا الا القطع بان ١٠٠

الأمور الالهية تتعالى بحكم الجلال عن ان توزن بميزان الاعتزل ؟
فإن قيل مهما قدر على رعاية الاصلح للعباد ، لم سَلَطَ عليهم اسباب العذاب ، كان ذلك قبيحاً لا يليق بالحكمة ، قلنا : معنى القبيح مالا يوافق الغرض ، حتى قد يكون الشيء قبيحاً عند شخص حسناً عند غيره ، اذا وافق غرض احدها دون الآخر ، حتى يستقبح قتل الشخص أولياؤه ويستحسنه اعداؤه . فان اريد بالقبيح ما لا يوافق غرض الباري فهو محال ، اذ لا غرض له ، فلا يتصور منه قبيح ، كما لا يتصور منه ظلم ، [٩٨ ب] اذ لا [يتصور منه] ٢ التصرف في ملك الغير . وان اريد بالقبيح ما لا يوافق غرض الغير ، فلم قلت ان ذلك عليه محال ؟ فهل هذا الا مجرد [تشبث] ٣ شهد بخلافه ما فرضناه من مخاصمة اهل النار . ثم الحكيم معناه العالم بحقائق الأشياء والقادر على إحكام فعلها على وفق ارادته ، وهذا من اين يوجب رعاية الأصلح ؟ وانما الحكيم منا يراعى الأصلح نظراً لنفسه ، ليستفيد في الدنيا ثناءً وفي الآخرة ثواباً ، أو يدفع [به] عن نفسه [آفة] ٤ ، وكل ذلك على الله تعالى محال .

الأصل الثامن : ان معرفة الله وطاعته واجبة بایجاب الله وشرعه لا بالعقل ، خلافاً للمعتزلة ، لأن العقل ان اوجب الطاعة ، فلا يخلو إما ان يوجبها لغير رائدة وهو محال ، فان العقل لا يوجب العبث ، واما ان يوجبها لفائدة وغرض ، (ذلك لا يخلو إما ان يرجع الى المعبود ، وذلك محال فانه يتقدس عن الاغراض والفوائد ، بل الكفر والايمان ، والطاعة والعصيان في حقه تعالى سيان ، واما ان

٣ "تشهي" في اوب ؛ تشبيه في ج

٢ "اذ لا يمكنه" في ا

١ كما في د

كما في د ؛ رحمة في النسخ الأخرى

يرجع الى غرض العبد وهو [ايضا] محال ، لأنه لا غرض له في الحال بل يتعب به وينصرف عن الشهوات بسببه ، وليس في المآل الا الثواب . ومن اين يعلم ان الله تعالى يثيب على [المعصية]^١ والطاعة ولا يعاقب عليهما ، مع ان الطاعة والمعصية في حقه يتساويان ، اذ ليس له الى احدهما ميل ولا لأحدهما به اختصاص ؟ وانما عرف تمييز ذلك بالشرع . ولقد زل من أخذ هذا من المقايسة بين الخالق والمخلوق ، حيث يفرق المخلوق بين الشكر والكفران ، لما له من الارتياح والاهتزاز والتلذذ بأحدهما دون الآخر .

فان قيل فاذا لم يجب النظر والمعرفة الا بالشرع ، والشرع لا يستقر ما لم ينظر المكلف فيه ، فاذا قال المكلف للنبي ان العقل ليس يوجب علي [النظر]^٢ ، والشرع لا يثبت [عندي]^٣ الا بالنظر ، ولست اقدم على النظر [الا بعد معرفة وجوبه]^٤ ، أدى الى إفحام الرسول ، قلنا : هذا يضاهي قول القائل للواقف في موضع من المواضع : ان وراءك سبعا ضاريا ، فان لم [تنزع]^٥ عن المكان قتلك ، [٩٩ أ] واذا التفت وراءك عرفت صدقي . فيقول الواقف : لا يثبت صدقك ما لم التفت ورأي ، ولا التفت ورأي ولا انظر ما لم يثبت صدقك . فيدل هذا على حماقة هذا القائل وتهدفه للهلاك ، ولاضرر [فيه] على الهادي المرشد .

فكذلك النبي يقول : وراءكم الموت ودونه السباع الضارية والنيران المحرقة ، ان لم تأخذوا منها حذرکم ، وتعرفوا صدقي بالالتفات الى معبرتي ! فمن التفت عرف واحترز ونجا ، ومن لم يلتفت وأصرهلك وتردى ، ولا ضرر علي ان هلك الناس كلهم اجمعون ، وانما علي البلاغ المبين . فالشرع يعرف وجود السباع الضارية بعد الموت ، والعقل يفيد فهم كلامه ، والاحاطة بامكان ما يقوله في المستقبل ، والطبع يستحث على الحذر من الضرر . ومعنى كون الشيء واجبا ان في تركه ضرراً ، ومعنى كون الشرع موجباً انه معرف للضرر المتوقع ، فان العقل لا يهدي الى التهدف للضرر بعد الموت عند اتباع الشهوات . فهذا معنى الشرع والعقل وتأثيرهما في تقرير الواجب ، ولولا خوف العقاب على ترك ما أمر به لم يكن الوجوب ثابتاً ، اذ لا معنى للواجب الا ما يرتبط بتركه ضرر في الآخرة .

الأصل التاسع : انه ليس يستحيل بعثة الانبياء خلافا للبراهمة ، حيث قالوا الا فائدة في بعثهم ، اذ في العقل مندوحة عنهم . [وهذا باطل]^٥ لأن العقل لا يهدي الى الأفعال المنجية في الآخرة ، كما لا يهدي الى الأدوية المفيدة للصحة [في الدنيا]^٦ ، فحاجة الخلق الى الأنبياء كحاجتهم الى الأطباء ، ولكن يعرف صدق الطبيب بالتجربة ، ويعرف صدق النبي بالمعجزة .

١ "المعرفة" في كل المخطوطات ٢ كما في د ٣ كما في ب وج ٤ "تنزع" في كل المخطوطات ٥ من هامش ا ٦ كما في ب

الأصل العاشر: ان الله تعالى قد ارسل محمداً صلى الله عليه وسلم خاتماً للنبيين، وناسخاً لما قبله من شرائع اليهود والنصارى والصابئين، وأيده بالمعجزات الظاهرة ١٠١ والآيات الباهرة، كانشقاق القمر، وتسبيح الحصى، وانطاق العجماء، وما تفجر من بين [٩٩ ب] اصابعه من الماء. ومن آياته الظاهرة التي تحدى بها كافة العرب القرآن، فانهم مع تمييزهم بالفصاحة والبلاغة تهدفوا [لسبه ونهيه]١ وقتله، ولم يقدروا على معارضته بمثله، اذ لم يكن في قدرة البشر الجمع بين جزالة القرآن ونظمه، هذا مع ما فيه من اخبار الأولين، مع كونه أمياً غير ممارس للكتب، والانباء عن الغيب في أمور تحقق صدقه [فيها] في الاستقبال، كقوله [تعالى]: لتدخلن المسجد الحرام ان شاء الله آمنين محلّقين رؤوسكم ومقصرين، وكقوله: ألم غلبت الروم، في أدنى الأرض وهم من بعد غلبهم سيغلبون، [في بضع سنين]. ووجه دلالة المعجزة على صدق الرسل ان كل ما عجز عنه البشر لم يكن الا فعلاً لله تعالى، فمهما كان مقروناً بتحدي النبي نزل منزلة قوله صدقت. وذلك مثل القائم بين يدي الملك، المدعي على رعيته انه رسول الملك [اليهم]، فانه مهما قال للملك إن كنت صادقاً فقم على سريرك ثلاثاً واقعد، على خلاف عادتك، ففعل الملك ذلك، حصل للحاضرين علم ضروري بأن ذلك نازل منزلة قوله صدقت.

الركن الرابع [من اركان الايمان] السمعيات، وتصديقه صلى الله عليه وسلم فيما اخبر عنه، ومداره على عشرة أصول

الأصل الأول: الحشر والنشر، وقد ورد بهما الشرع، وهو حق والتصديق به واجب، لأنه في العقل ممكن. ومعناه الاعادة بعد الافناء، وذلك مقدور لله تعالى كابتداء الانشاء. قال الله تعالى: قال من يحيي العظام وهي رميم، قل يحييها الذي انشأها اول مرة. فاستدل بالابتداء على الاعادة. وقال [عز وجل]: ما خلقكم ولا بعثكم الا كنفس واحدة. والاعادة ابتداء ثان، فهو ممكن كالابتداء الأول. الأصل الثاني: سؤال منكر ونكير، وقد وردت به الاخبار، فيجب التصديق به لانه يمكن، اذ ليس يستدعي الا اعادة الحياة الى جزء من الأجزاء الذي به فهم [١٠٠ أ] الخطاب، وذلك ممكن في نفسه. ولا يدفع ذلك ما يشاهد من سكون اجزاء الميت وعدم سماعنا للسؤال، فان النائم ساكن بظاهره ومدرك بباطنه من الآلام واللذات ما يحس تأثيره عند التنبه. وقد كان يسمع رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم كلام جبريل عليه السلام ويشاهده، ومن حوله لا يسمعون ولا يرونه، ولا يحيطون بشيء من علمه الا بما شاء. فاذا لم يخلق لهم السمع والرؤية لم يدركوه.

١ "سببه ونهيه" في كل المخطوطات، وايضاً في د

الأصل الثالث : عذاب القبر، وقد ورد الشرع به . قال تعالى : النار يعرضون عليها غدوا وعشيا، ويوم تقوم الساعة أدخلوا آل فرعون اشد العذاب . واشتهر عن رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم والسلف الصالحين الاستعاذة من عذاب القبر، وهو ممكن فيجب التصديق به . ولا يمنع من التصديق به تفرق اجزاء الميت في بطون السباع وحواصل الطير، فان المدرك لألم العذاب من الحيوان اجزاء مخصوصة يقدر الله تعالى على اعادة الادراك اليها .

الأصل الرابع : الميزان [وهو حق] .^١ قال الله تعالى : ونضع الموازين القسط ليوم القيامة . وقال تعالى : فمن ثقلت موازينه [فاولئك هم المفلحون] . ومن خفت موازينه فاولئك الذين خسروا انفسهم] . ووجهه ان الله تعالى يحدث في صحائف الأعمال وزناً بحسب درجات الاعمال عند الله ، فتصير مقادير اعمال العباد معلومة للعباد ، حتى يظهر لهم العدل في العقاب ، او الفضل في العفو وتضعيف الثواب .

الأصل الخامس : الصراط، وهو جسر ممتد على متن النار، أدق من الشعرة وأحد من السيف . قال تعالى : فاهدوهم الى صراط الجحيم ، وقفّوهم انهم مسؤولون . وهذا ممكن فيجب التصديق به . فان القادر على ان يطير الطير في الهواء ، قادر على ان يسير الانسان على الصراط .

الأصل السادس : ان الجنة والنار مخلوقتان . قال الله تعالى : وسارعوا الى مغفرة من ربكم وجنة عرضها السموات والأرض أعدت للمتقين . فقوله أعدت [١٠٠ ب] دليل على انها مخلوقة ، فيجب اجراؤه على الظاهر اذ لا استحالة فيه . ولا يقال لا فائدة في خلقها قبل يوم الجزاء ، لأن الله تعالى لا يسأل عما يفعل وهم يسألون .

الأصل السابع : ان الامام الحق بعد رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم ابو بكر، ثم عمر، ثم عثمان، ثم علي، رضي الله عنهم . ولم يكن نص رسول الله على امام اصلا ، اذ لو كان لكان أولى بالظهور من نصبه آحاد الولاة والامراء على الجنود في البلاد . ولم يخف ذلك فكيف خفي هذا ؟ او ان كان ظهر كيف اندرس حتى لم ينقل اليينا ؟ فلم يكن ابو بكر اماماً الا بالاختيار والبيعة . واما تقدير النص على غيره فهو نسبة للصحابة كلهم الى مخالفة رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم وخرق الاجماع ، وذلك مما لم يتجرأ على اختراعه الا الروافض . واعتقاد اهل السنة تركية جميع الصحابة والثناء عليهم كما اثنى الله ورسوله عليهم . وما جرى بين معاوية وعلي، رضي الله عنهما ، كان مبني على الاجتهاد ، لامنازعة من معاوية في الامامة ، اذ ظن علي ان تسليم قتلة عثمان مع كثرة عشائريهم واختلاطهم بالعسكر يؤدي الى اضطراب أمر الامامة في بدايتها ، فرأى التأخير أصوب ، وظن معاوية ان تأخير امرهم مع عظم جنايتهم يوجب الإغراء بالأئمة ، ويعرض الدماء للسفك . وقد قال افاضل العلماء : كل مجتهد

مصيب . وقال قائلون : المصيب واحد . ولم يذهب الى تخطئة علي رضي الله عنه ذو تحصيل اصلا .

الأصل الثامن : ان فضل الصحابة رضي الله عنهم على حسب ترتيبهم في الخلافة ، اذ حقيقة الفضل ما هو فضل عند الله تعالى ، وذلك لا يطلع عليه الا رسول الله . وقد ورد[ت] في الثناء على جميع أخبار . وانما يدرك المشاهدون للوحي والتنزيل بقرائن الاحوال دقائق التفضيل ، فلولا فهم ذلك لما رتبوا الأمر كذلك ، اذ كانوا لا تأخذهم [١٠١ أ] في الله لومة لائم ، ولا يصرفهم عن الحق صارف .

الأصل التاسع : ان شرائط الإمامة بعد الاسلام والتكليف خمسة : الذكورة والورع والعلم والكفاية ونسب قريش ، لقوله صلى الله عليه وسلم : الأئمة من قريش . واذا اجتمع عدد من الموصوفين بهذه الصفات فالامام من انعقدت له البيعة من اكثر الخلق ، والمخالف للأكثر باغ يجب رده الى الانقياد للحق .

الأصل العاشر : انه لو تعذر وجود الورع والعلم فيمن تصدى للإمامة ، وكان في صرفه إثارة فتنة لا تطاق ، حكمنا بانعقاد إمامته ، لانا بين ان نحرك فتنة بالاستبدال ، فما يلقي المسلمون فيه من الضرر يزيد على ما يفوتهم من نقصان هذه الشروط التي أثبتت لمزية المصلحة ، فلا يهدم اصل المصلحة شغفا بمزاياها ، كالذي يبني قصراً ويهدم مصرأ ، وبين أن نحكم بخلو البلاد من الامام وبفساد الأفضية ، وذلك محال . فنحن نقضي بنفوذ قضاء اهل البغي في بلادهم لمسيس حاجتهم ، فكيف لا نقضي بصحة الامامة عند الحاجة والضرورة ؟

فهذه الأركان الأربعة الحاوية للأصول الأربعين ، هي قواعد العقائد . فمن اعتقدها كان موافقاً لأهل السنة ، ومبائناً لرهط البدعة . والله تعالى يسدّدنا بتوفيقه ، ويهدينا الى الحق وتحقيقه ، بمنه وسعة جوده . [وقد فرغت من تصنيفه في المسجد الأقصى ، بحجبا لالتماس أهله ، وراجيا لان ننال بركته وبركة دعاء سكانه ، وان يحقق الله املنا ، ويختم بالسعادة أجلنا ، انه الكريم المنان] .^١

وعلى الهامش :

[وقد فرغت من الرسالة القدسية ، التي اودعتها في هذا الفصل ، في المسجد الأقصى ، بحجبا لالتماس أهله ، وراجيا لان ننال بركته وبركة دعاء سكانه ، وسائلاً متضرعاً من الله تعالى ان يختم لنا بالسعادة ، انه الكريم المنان ، الدائم الاحسان] .^١

THE JERUSALEM TRACT

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. Praise be to Him who distinguished the followers of the Prophet with the light of certain belief, who favoured the adherents of the true religion with His guidance to its fundamentals, who saved them from following those who deviate from the right path and those atheists who go astray, who guided them to follow the example of the foremost of His messengers, who led them to emulate his noble Companions, who eased their way to follow in the footsteps of the righteous ancestors of the community, so that they found refuge from the dictates of reason in their faith , and from the example and beliefs of the ancient peoples in the well-defined path .

But they freely reconciled the deductions of human reason with the postulates of the divine law, and thus realized that the pronouncement of ‘There is no god but God, and Muhammad is the messenger of God’ is not enough unless the fundamental principles underlying this formula are fully grasped. They also realized that the two parts of the formula , though brief, enshrine confirmations of the essence (dhat) of God, of His attributes (sifdt), His works (af'dl), and the truthfulness of His messenger. They further realized that the structure of faith is based upon these four pillars, each of which is based upon ten fundamentals.

The first pillar is concerned with the knowledge of the essence of God most high and has ten fundamentals: that He exists (wujud) ; that He is pre-existent (qidam) and everlasting (baqd :’) j that He is neither a substance (jauhar) nor body (jism) nor accident i^arad) ; that He is not limited by direction (jihah) nor settled in a location (makdn) ; that He can be seen and that He is One.

The second pillar is concerned with His attributes and comprises ten fundamentals, namely the knowledge that He is living (haiy), all-knowing all-powerful (qadir), all-willing (murid), all-hearing (samf), all-seeing (baslr) i and speaking (mutakallim), but is exalted above and immune from incorporation in phenomena; and that His speech, knowledge, and will are pre-existent and eternal.

The third is concerned with His works and includes ten fundamentals: that God most high is the creator of His servants’ actions; that these actions are acquired (muktasabah) by His servants; that they are willed (muradah) by Him; that He is gracious to create and to create from nothing; that it is His prerogative to impose duties (takltf) beyond the capacity [of His servants], and to cause pain (ilam) to the innocent; that it is not incumbent upon Him to do the most favourable [to His servants] ; that [man’s]

obligations are all laid down in the divine law (shot ') ; that His sending of prophets is not impossible f ja'iz) ; and that the prophet hood of our prophet Muhammad (God bless and save him) is proved, and confirmed by miracles.

The fourth is concerned with beliefs accepted on oral authority (sam'iyyat) and contains ten fundamentals: confirmation of the belief in the resurrection of the dead and the reckoning [before despatch to Paradise or Hell]; in the torment of [the dead in] the grave; in the interrogation of [the dead by the two angels] Munkar and Naklr; in [the weighing of the actions of men in] the balance (i mizan) ; in [the ordeal of passing over] the bridge (as-sirat) ; in [God's] creation of paradise and hell; in the rules concerning the imamate; in the excellence of the Companions of the Prophet according to their order [in assuming office]; in the qualification necessary in the imam; and in the legitimacy of the imamate even without the imam being endowed with piety and learning.

The First Pillar of the Faith is the Knowledge of the Essence of God and Comprises Ten Fundamentals.

(1)- The first fundamental is the knowledge of His existence. The foremost guiding light, and the path most likely to lead to it, are indicated in the Qur'an, since all guidance (baydn) beyond that of God is superfluous:

The most high said: 'Have We not made the earth as a cradle and the mountains as pegs? And We created you in pairs, and We appointed your sleep for a rest; and We appointed night for a garment, and We appointed day for a livelihood. And We have built above you seven strong ones, and We appointed a blazing lamp, and have sent down out of the rain-clouds water cascading that We may bring forth thereby grain and plants, and gardens luxuriant.'

And the most high said: 'Surely in the creation of the heavens and the earth and the alternation of night and day and the ship that runs in the sea with profit to men and the water God sends down from heaven therewith reviving the earth after it is dead and His scattering abroad in it all manner of crawling things, and the turning about of the winds and the clouds compelled between heaven and earth — surely these are signs for a people having understanding.'

And the most high said: 'Have you not regarded how God created seven heavens one upon another, and set the moon therein for a light and the sun for a lamp? And God caused you to grow out of the earth, and He shall return you into it, and bring you forth.'

And He said: ‘Have you considered the seed you spill? Do you yourselves create it, or are We the Creators? We have decreed among you Death; We shall not be outstripped; that We may exchange the likes of you, and make you to grow again in a fashion you know not. You have known the first growth; so why will you not remember? Have you considered the soil you till? Do you yourselves sow it, or are We the Sowers? Did We will, We would make it broken orts, and you would remain bitterly jesting — ‘We are debt-loaded; nay, we have been robbed!’ Have you considered the water you drink? Did you send it down from the clouds, or did We send it? Did We will, We would make it bitter; so why are you not thankful? Have you considered the fire you kindle? Did you make its timber to grow, or did We make it? We Ourselves made it for a reminder, and a boon to the desert dweller.’

It should be apparent to anyone with the minimum of intelligence if he reflects a little upon the implication of these verses, and if he looks at the wonders in God’s creation on earth and in the skies and at the wonders in animals and plants, that this marvellous, well-ordered system cannot exist without a maker who conducts it, and a creator who plans and perfects it. Indeed, human nature itself seems to testify that it is subjected to the Creator’s direction, and directed according to His management. Hence God most high said: ‘Is there any doubt regarding God, the Originator of the heavens and the earth.?’ Hence also He sent the prophets to call mankind (al-khalq) to the belief in the unity [of God] and to say ‘there is no god but God’.

They were not commanded to say ‘we have a god and [the rest of] the world has a god’, for [the conception of the Unity of God] is innate in their minds since they were first created and [continues with them] in the prime of their youth. For this reason God most high said: ‘If thou askest them, “Who created the heavens and the earth?” they will say, “God”.’ The most high also said: ‘So set thy face to the religion, a man of pure faith — God’s original upon which He originated mankind. There is no changing of God’s creation. That is the right religion.’

There is then in the nature of man and in the testimony of the Qur’an enough evidence to make the necessity of [logical] proof (burhan) superfluous. However, we wish to produce such supporting proofs in emulation of the well known among the learned, as follows: It is self-evident to human reason that there must be a cause (sabab) for the origination (huduth) of anything originated (hadith) . Since the universe is originated it follows that there was a cause for its origination.

Our statement that there must be a cause for the origination of anything originated is clear, since everything originated is related to time which human reason can assume to

be early or late. The assignment of the originated to a particular time, which is neither before nor after its own, is necessarily dependent upon the one who so assigns it. Then the proof of our statement that the universe is originated is that material objects in the universe are either at rest or in motion, and since both rest and motion are originated, it follows that what is subject to the originated (hawadith) is itself originated (hadith).

There are thus three propositions in this proof. The first is our statement that material objects are either at rest or in motion. This statement is self-evident and requires no mental reflection for its comprehension. For he who can conceive a material object which is neither at rest nor in motion is both obstinately ignorant and unwilling to follow the path of reason.

The second proposition is our statement that rest and motion are originated. This is proved by their alternate occurrence, as is observable in all material objects, those that can be seen as well as those that cannot. For there can be nothing at rest which human reason does not decide that it is capable of moving, and there can be nothing in motion which human reason does not decide that it is capable of coming to a standstill. Of the two states of rest and motion that which happens to occur at a time (tar?) is originated, because it did occur. The previous state [of an object whether at rest or in motion] is also originated, for were its eternity (qidam) proved, its non-existence ('adam) would be impossible (as we shall show in proving that the Creator, most high and hallowed, is pre-existent and everlasting).

The third proposition is our statement that what is subject to the originated is itself originated. The proof is that were it not so, it would be necessary to assume the existence before everything originated of another so originated, and so on ad infinitum , so that unless all these originated things did come and pass, the turn of the one in question would never come. But this is impossible because there is no end to infinity.

Another proof is the revolutions of the celestial spheres. Were these revolutions infinite, their number would be either odd or even, or both odd and even, or neither odd nor even. But it is impossible that the number could be both odd and even, or neither odd nor even, for this would combine the positive with the negative, so that affirmation of the one would involve the negation of the other, and vice versa. Further, it is impossible for the number of revolutions to be even [only], since even becomes odd by the addition of one to it — and [behold] how the infinite stands in need of one! It is also impossible to be odd [only] since odd becomes even by the addition of one — and [behold] how the infinite stands in need of one! Finally, it is impossible for that number to be neither odd nor even, for this would mean that it is finite.

The sum of all this is that the universe is subject to origination (hawadith), that it is therefore originated (hadith), that its actual origination (huduth) is proved, and that its dependence upon the Creator (al-muhdith) is ipso facto (bid-darurah) comprehensible.

(2) The second fundamental is the knowledge that the Creator most high is pre-existent (qadim) and eternal (azali), that there is no beginning for His existence, that He is the beginning (awwal) of everything, and that He [existed] before everything dead or alive. And here is the proof: Were He himself created and not pre-existent, His own coming into existence would have required a creator, and His creator another creator and so on ad infinitum , without ultimately leading to one preexistent, first creator who is the object [of our search], and Whom we called the Creator (sam) of the universe, its Initiator (mubdi) and its Contriver (mubdi').

(3) The third fundamental is the knowledge that He most high is eternal without a beginning and everlasting without an end. For [accords ing to revelation] 'He is the First and the Last, the Outward and the Inward'; and [according to reason] it is impossible to imagine the non-existence (' adam) of that which has been shown to be eternal. And here is the proof: If the possibility of its non-existence is assumed, then this could be self-inflicted or through the action of an opponent. But were it possible for a thing (whose existence is conceivable) to be annihilated by itself, it would be possible for a thing (whose non-existence is conceivable) to come into existence by itself.

Thus the occurrence (tar ay an) of existence, like the occurrence of annihilation, requires a cause. But it is absurd and unimaginable to assume His annihilation through an opponent, for that would require the assumption of the latter's being pre-existent and co-existent with Him. Through the two preceding fundamentals His existence and His eternity were proved. How, then, is it possible to conceive of an opponent with Him in pre-existence? It is also impossible for this opponent to be himself originated, since it is less likely for the originated [to succeed] in its opposition to the eternal with a view to its destruction than it is likely for the eternal in its opposition to the originated with a view to preventing its coming into existence. F or prevention is indeed easier than destruction, and the eternal is stronger than and more superior to the originated.

(4) The fourth fundamental is the knowledge that He is not a substance which occupies space and that He is too exalted and hallowed to have any relation to space. And here is the proof: Every substance which occupies a space is conditioned by this space, and is either at rest in that space or in motion away from it, i.e. it is subject to motion and rest which are originated, and what is subject to originated changes (hawadith) is itself originated. But if it were possible to imagine [the existence] of a pre-eternal (qadlm) substance which is limited by space, the pre-eternity (qidam) of all substance in the

universe would be conceivable. Hence if someone should use the term ‘substance’ in reference to Him, without intending to mean substance which is limited by space, he would be verbally wrong but not in meaning.

(5) The fifth fundamental is the knowledge that He most high is not a body (jism) composed of substance. [Its proof is this:] A body is composed of substances. But since it has been disproved that He was a substance limited by space, He cannot be a body, since every body is limited by space and is composed of substances, and since also it is impossible to dissociate substance from composition (ijtima ‘) and decomposition (iftiraq) , motion (harakah) and rest (. sukun), form (haiah) and quantity (miqdar) , all of which are characteristics of the originated. But if it were permissible to believe that the Creator of the universe is a body, then it would be permissible to believe in the divinity (ilahiyyah) of the sun and the moon or other parts of the material world. Hence if someone should dare to refer to Him most high as a body, without intending [to mean] His composition of substances, he would be wrong as regards the term, but at the same time right in repudiating its corporeal meaning.

(6) The sixth fundamental is the knowledge that He most high is not an accident inherent in a body or settled in a location. For body is subject to accident and is necessarily originated, and its originator would exist before it. Is it possible then that He could be incorporated (hallan) in a body when He existed from all eternity alone, with none besides Him, and then created all substances and accidents afterwards? Besides, He is all-knowing (‘ alim), all-powerful (qadir), all- willing (s murid), and creator (khaliq), as will be shown, and these attributes are impossible for accidents. Nay, they are not conceivable except for a Being (i maujiid) who is self-existent and self-dependent.

It was thus established through [the discussion of] these fundamentals that He exists, self-existent, neither a substance nor a body nor an accident, while the whole universe is made up of these. Hence He resembles nothing and nothing resembles Him. He is the Living (al-haiy), the Everlasting (al-qayyum), like Him there is naught. How impossible it is for the created to resemble its Creator, the predestined its Predestinator (i muqaddir), and the fashioned its fashioner (; musawwir). All bodies and accidents are of His creation and workmanship, and by His predestination it is impossible for them to be like or to resemble Him.

(7) The seventh fundamental is the knowledge that the essence of God most high is exalted above (mumzzah) the notion of limitation by any direction. For direction is either up or down, right or left, front or behind, and these were created by Him through His creation of man. He created him with two extremities, the one rests on earth and is

called foot, and the other, its opposite, is called head. The notion of up (ismu'lfauq) was originated (hadatha) to indicate what is above the head and the conception down to indicate what is near the location of the foot. [This is true] even of an ant creeping along a ceiling: what is down in relation to its position is still up in relation to ours. Then He created man with two hands, the one usually stronger than the other, and thus the notion of right was created and assigned to the stronger, and the notion of left to its counterpart, and thus what is on the one side is called right, and on the other left. Then He created man with two sides, the one within the range of his sight and towards which he moves, and thus [He] created the notion of front for the direction towards which man advances through movement, and the notion of behind to the counterpart.

All directions are therefore originated through the fact that man is originated. But supposing that man was created after a different fashion such as round like a sphere, these directions would never have existed! Is it possible, then, that He was in all eternity limited by direction which is originated or that He became limited by direction after He had had none? Is this possible by His creation of the universe under Him (tahtahu) ? But since the direction of under or down is related to the foot, may He be exalted above being limited by such direction, and above [the assumption] that He has a foot! All of this is impossible for the mind to conceive. For the conceivable is that whatever is limited by direction is also limited by space like substance, or is limited by substance in the same way as accidents are.

But the impossibility of His being a substance or an accident has been proved. Therefore it is impossible for Him to be limited by direction. But if by direction is meant other than these two meanings it would be wrong to use the term though helpful for the meaning. Again if [it is conceivable] that He is above the universe He would be also opposite to it. All that lies opposite to a body is either equal to it in size or smaller or larger. But all these are assessments which necessarily require an assessor to make. May the Creator, the One and Ruler, be exalted above that!

As to raising of hands heavenwards at the time of petition it is because heaven is the [usual] direction of supplication. It also indicates the supplicant's recognition of the majesty (jaldl) and magnificence (kibriya') of the One to whom supplication is made, since the raising of hands upwards suggests His glory (majd) and most-elevated position (W). For verily the most high is above all beings by His omnipotent power (bi'l qahri wa'l isfila).

(8) The eighth fundamental is the knowledge that He most high is settled upon His throne, in the sense which He most high intended by settlement. [This is a sense] which is neither inconsistent with His magnificence nor implies any of the characteristics of

[the finite such as] origination and annihilation. It is the sense which He intended by His saying in the Qur'an: 'Then He lifted Himself (istawa) to Heaven when it was smoke.' That was in no other way except by His omnipotent power (as the poet said: Bishr has gained control over Iraq, without sword or bloodshed).

Such interpretation was forced upon the people [who seek the obvious meaning] of the revelation. Likewise those who seek the hidden meaning were forced to resort to interpretation. Thus God's words 'He is with you wherever you are' were generally interpreted to mean 'by His omniscience'. Similarly the words of the Prophet (God bless and save him): 'The heart of the believer is between two of the fingers of the Merciful' were interpreted to mean 'subject to His omnipotence'. Again his word (God bless and save him) 'The Black Stone is the right hand of God in His earth' were interpreted to [enjoin] regard and honour [to the stone.] Otherwise, if the apparent meaning [on all these matters were adopted] it would necessitate the impossible.

So also would His istiwa' [upon the Throne]. For if taken to mean settlement or possession it would necessitate that He who settles upon the Throne or possesses it, is a substance in contact with the Throne and that He is either equal to it in size, or larger or smaller. But this is impossible, and what leads to the impossible is it self impossible.

(9) The ninth fundamental is the knowledge that, while He most high is exalted above being limited by form (surah), quantity, direction, and location, He will be seen with the eyes in the everlasting abode. This is proved by His saying: 'Upon that day faces shall be radiant, gazing upon their Lord.' That He cannot be seen in the life here below is confirmed by His words most high: 'The eyes attain Him not, but He attains the eyes.' And also in His address most high to Musa (Peace be upon him): 'Thou shalt not see Me!'

How then could a Mu'tazilite [who denies that God can be seen] presume to know of the attributes 10 of God that which Musa did not know ? Or is it conceivable that Musa would have prayed to see God if seeing Him was impossible? Ignorance is more befitting heretics and schismatics than prophets!

Even according to its apparent meaning, the interpretation of the verse on seeing God does not lead to what is impossible. For seeing means here a kind of inspiration (kashf) and acquiring knowledge (-ilm) although it is more perfect and clear than knowing. If it is permissible (jaza) to speak of knowing Him without relation to [space and] direction it is also permissible to speak of seeing Him without relation to [space and] direction. Again, just as it is conceivable (yajuzu) for God to see His creatures without being in an apposite position in relation to them, so it is conceivable for His creatures to see Him

without being in an apposite position in relation to Him. Finally, since He can be known without asking how' and without any reference to form, He can be seen under the same conditions.

(10) The tenth fundamental is the knowledge that God (to whom glory and majesty belong) is one (wahid) with no associate (shank), single (fard) with no equal, unique in creating and creating from nothing, and that He has neither match nor equal, and that He has no opponent to contend or alternate with Him. Its proof is His saying most high: 'Why, were there gods in earth and heaven other than God, they would surely go to ruin / Its explanation is this : Were there two gods and one of them resolved on a course of action (arada amran), the second would be either obliged to aid him and thereby demonstrating that he was a subordinate being and not an all-powerful god, or would be able to oppose and resist thereby demonstrating that he was the all-powerful and the first weak and deficient, not an all-powerful god.

The Second Pillar of the Faith is the Knowledge of the Attributes of God and Comprises Ten Fundamentals

(1) The first fundamental is the knowledge that the Creator of the universe is all-powerful (qadir) and that He most high is truthful in saying: 'And He is powerful over everything / For the universe is thoroughly made and well ordered \ and he who would consider a silk garment, well designed and woven with symmetrical embroidery, and adornment, and could imagine that it was the work of a dead person or of a person with no power, would be devoid of native intelligence and [must be counted] among the foolish and ignorant.

(2) The second fundamental is the knowledge that He most high is all-knowing (' alim) of all beings, [that His knowledge] encompasses all creatures, that not so much as the weight of an ant on earth and in heaven escapes His knowledge, that He is truthful in saying: 'And He has knowledge of everything , and that He provides a guide to His truthfulness by saying: 'Shall He not know who created? And He is the All-subtle, the All-aware. 54 He has thus guided you to deduce from [His being the cause] of creation that He is all-knowing. For you could not deny the evidence of subtle and well-ordered creation, even in mean and trivial things, as confirmation of the knowledge of the creator how to design and regulate creation. And the word of God most high is the best in guidance and explanation.

(3) The third fundamental is the knowledge that He is living (haiy). For he who has been proved to be all-knowing and all-powerful is necessarily proven to be living. If it is possible to imagine the existence of one who is powerful, knowing, maker, and

manager without being alive, it would be legitimate to doubt life in animals which alternate between motion and rest, or even in those who practice the arts and crafts. That would indeed be a plunge into the deep waters of ignorance.

(4) The fourth fundamental is the knowledge that He most high is all- willing (murid). He wills His works, and nothing exists except through His will. He is the originator and the bringer again, and the performer of what He desires. [How could He be otherwise, when] it is conceivable that He could have willed [at a given time] the opposite of every work that came into existence through His will; and that which has no opposite could also have come into existence through His will before or after [that given time]. His power (qudrah) encompasses the two opposites and the two times, but there must be a will that directs the power to one or the other. If in the identification of the known, knowledge could do without will so that it would be possible to say that a given thing came into existence at a time prior to the knowledge of its existence, then knowledge could do without power so that it would be possible to say that the given thing came into existence without power because its prior existence was known.

(5) The fifth fundamental is the knowledge that He most high is all hearing (sam'), all-seeing (baslr). He sees even the innermost and most concealed thoughts, and He hears even the creeping of a black ant in a dark night on a hard rock. Is it conceivable that He is not all-hearing and all-seeing when hearing and seeing are indisputably attributes of excellence not of scantiness? For how then could the created be better equipped than the creator, the fashioned object more perfect than its fashioner? Or how could they ever be equated no matter how much He might diminish, and His creatures and handiwork increase, in perfection? Or how again could Ibrahim's argument (peace be upon him) be valid against his father who in ignorance and error worshipped idols? He said to his father: 'Why worshippest thou that which neither hears nor sees, nor avails thee anything?' For were this true of the God Ibrahim worshipped, not only his argument would be invalid, but also the truth of the word of the most high would be questioned: 'That is Our argument which We bestowed upon Ibrahim as against his people.'

Now, then, since it is conceivable that He acts (fa'il) without having physical members (bila jarihah), and that He is all-knowing without [physical] heart or brain, it must also be conceivable that He is allseeing without an eye and all-hearing without an ear, since there is no difference between the one conception and the other.

(6) The sixth fundamental is that He most high is speaking (mutakallim) a speech which is sui generis (qaimun bi-dhatihi) ; it is neither sound nor letter. For His speech does not resemble that of any other, just as His existence does not resemble that of any other. [Human] speech is in reality that of the soul; sounds are formed into letters merely as

indicators, just as sounds are sometimes indicated by movements and gestures. How could this [matter] be obscure to a foolish group, and be so plain to ignorant poets? One of them said: ‘Verily the seat of words (kalam) is in the heart, and the tongue is a mere indicator of [what is in] the heart.’

[If you encounter] one whose mind does not restrain him from saying ‘my tongue is created, but what it utters (ma yahduthu fthi) through my own created power is uncreated’, do not entertain respect for his mind and restrain your tongue from addressing him. Again [if you encounter] one who does not realize that the pre-existent (aUqadim) has no antecedent, and that in Bismillah the letter ‘b’ comes before the letter ‘s’ and that hence the latter cannot take precedence over the former, free your heart from any preoccupation with him. For God has His design in removing away some of His creatures [from the truth] : ‘And whomsoever God leads astray, no guide has he.

[Another example is] the one who is reluctant to believe that Musa (peace be upon him) could in this world hear a speech which is neither sound nor letter. Let him [dare] deny seeing in the next world a Being who is neither body, nor colour. If he could conceive the possibility of seeing that which is neither body, nor colour, nor quantity, contrary to his experience so far , let him then allow (falya'qil) for the faculty of hearing what he allowed for the faculty of seeing. If he could conceive that He has one attribute of knowledge embracing all existence, let him then conceive that His essence has one attribute of speech embracing all that could be expressed in words.

Again, if he could conceive a small piece of paper on which is written the existence of the Seven Heavens, Paradise, and Hell and [this information could] be preserved in a small particle of the heart and seen through an eyeball the size of lentil seed, without the Heavens , Paradise, and Hell actually existing in the eyeball or the heart or the paper, let him then conceive [His] speech as read through the tongues, preserved in the hearts, and written in the Qur’an (masahif) without the speech itself being incorporated into these. For if [it is conceivable that] the speech of God could actually be incorporated into the paper [of the Qur’an] by the writing of His name on it, then it would be conceivable for actual fire to burn the paper [of the Qur’an] by writing the word fire on it .

(7) The seventh fundamental is the knowledge that, in addition to being sui generis , His speech has, like all His other attributes, existed from all eternity, and that it is impossible to be subject to creation and change. Indeed, belief in the all eternity of His attributes is just as incumbent [upon the believer] as belief in the eternity of His essence. God then is subject to no change or accident; He is eternal and eternally adorned with the most praiseworthy attributes, and will to all eternity remain above all vicissitudes.

Consider that whatever is subject to change (mahal al-hawadith) is not free from it, and that whatever is not free from change is necessarily originated. Thus material objects are proven to be originated because they are subject to change in their substance and their qualities. Is it conceivable that their Creator could, like them, be subject to change? On the basis of these [arguments we conclude that] His speech is ancient and sui generis , and that what is created is merely the sounds which indicate the speech.

It is, of course, conceivable for a father to cherish a desire that his notyet-born son should seek education (ta‘ allum) i and that after his birth and growth God creates in him an awareness of his father’s secret desire. It then becomes incumbent upon the son to fulfil that desire which remained a secret in the father’s heart till the son knew of it. [If this is conceivable] then let it be so concerning the command to Musa (peace be upon him) by the most high: ‘Tut off your shoes.’ Apprehend then that this command coexisted with God from eternity and that it was addressed to Musa after his birth and growth when God created in him an awareness of that command and a faculty to hear that eternal speech.

(8) The eighth fundamental is that His knowledge is pre-existent and that He is ever all-knowing by virtue of His essence and His attributes, and [His knowledge encompasses all] which He creates. But whatever creation comes into existence, His knowledge of it is not created; it is simply plain to Him through [His] eternal knowledge. Thus if we were provided with the knowledge that Zaid would arrive at sunrise, and it is assumed that this knowledge remained valid till sunrise, Zaid’s arrival at that moment would have been known to us through that foreknowledge alone without need for another new knowledge. This is the manner of comprehending the pre-existence of God’s knowledge most high.

(9) The ninth fundamental is that His will is pre-existent and from all eternity it regulates the various creations at the right time and according to His prior eternal knowledge. For were His will created He would be Subject to phenomenal change, or were it to reside in other than Hi? Essence He would have no control over it. An example: you yourself cannot move if the motive is outside yourself, for then no matter how able (willing) you feel, your will is dependent upon another will, and this will depend upon another ad infinitum. If the existence of one will is conceivable without another, then it is conceivable that the universe could come into existence without the will [of God].

(10) The tenth fundamental is that God most high is all-knowing with His knowledge (‘alimun bi-ilm)fi living with His being (haiun bi-hayah), all-powerful with His power (qadvrun bi-qudr ah) , all- willing with His will (murldun bi-iradah) , all-speaking with

His speech (mutakallimun bi-kalam) , all-hearing with His hearing (samV bi-sam'), all-seeing with His sight (bastrun bi-basar), and that He has these distinguished characteristics (ausaf) of His eternal attributes.

If one says ‘a learned man without knowledge’ it is like saying ‘a rich man without wealth’, ‘learning without the learned’, and ‘learned without learning’. For learning (knowledge) , the learned, and the thing known are as inseparable as killing, the killer, and the killed. It is not possible to imagine a killer without killing and killed, or a killed without a killer and killing. Similarly it is not possible to imagine learned without learning, learning without something known, or something known without one learned. The three are inseparable in the mind. He who considers it legitimate to separate the learned from learning, let him also legitimize the separation of the learned from the thing learned, and the separation of learning from the learned, since there is no difference between these analogies (idafat).

The Third Pillar of the Faith is the Knowledge of the Works of God and Comprises Ten Fundamentals

(1) The first fundamental: the knowledge that everything originated in the universe is His work, creation, and invention. None other than Him is creator and originator. He created men and created their actions, and initiated their capacity (qudrah) and their movement (j harakah). Thus all the actions of His servants are created by Him and dependent upon His power (qudrah), as it is confirmed in His words most high: ‘God is the Creator of every thing’; ‘And God created you and what you make’ ; ‘Be secret in your speech, or proclaim it, He knows the thoughts within the breasts. Shall He not know who created? And He is the unsubtle, the All-aware.’

He commanded His servants to be cautious in their words, deeds, and secret thoughts, for He knows their tendencies and indicated [this] knowledge [in the verse ‘shall He not know who created?’ by reminding His servants that He is the] creator . Is it conceivable that He is not the creator of His servant’s works when His power is perfect, without any shortcomings, and when upon it the corporeal movements (harakatu abdan) of His servant depend? Such movements are similar in nature, and His power controls them inevitably. What is then [the presumed factor] which can restrict its control to some and not the others of these similar movements (harakat)? Or how [could it be presumed] that animals monopolize creation and invention? For the spider, the bee, and all the animals produce fine works which puzzle the minds of the intelligent how could they invent such works alone, without the aid of the supreme Lord, and without being aware of the details of their acquired skill (iktisab) ? Away, away [with such thoughts!] Let

His creatures be humbled and let Him, the all-powerful, rule supreme in heaven and on earth.

(2) The second fundamental: God is the sole creator of His servants' actions (harakat), but these are also within the capacity (qudrah) of the servants through acquisition (iktisab) A For God most high created both the capacity and what it can accomplish, the choice and the chosen. Capacity is merely descriptive in reference to the servant, but it is the creation of the Lord and not His acquisition. Action (harakah) is the creation of the Lord but descriptive of the servant and an acquisition by him for it was created by the power (qudrah) which is one of His attributes. But action is related to another capacity and this relationship makes it an acquisition.

How can human actions be all by compulsion (jabrari) when man knows instinctively the difference between his voluntary and involuntary movements? Or how can they be man's creation (khalqan) when he has no comprehensive knowledge of the minute details of the acquired movements and their number? Now since both propositions have been shown to be false there remains only the golden mean in belief, namely that [man's actions] are initiated by the power of God most high and, through acquisition, by a relative capacity of man himself.

But the connexion of the created with the power of the creator need not be restricted to creation from nothing, since the power of God most high was from all eternity connected with the universe without any such creation taking place through it [as yet], and since at the time when creation from nothing does take place there is between them another kind of connexion. From the foregoing it is evident that the power is not dependent upon the occurrence of creation.

(3) The third fundamental is that, though acquired, the actions of God's servant are still willed (murad) by God most high. For nothing happens in the seen and unseen universe (al-mulk wa al-malakut), not even a twinkling of an eye or an unguarded thought, except by God's predetermined purpose (qada '), His power, and His will. He is the cause (minhu) of good and evil, benefit and harm, Islam and infidelity, acknowledgement and denial [of God], success and failure, rectitude and error, obedience and rebellion, association of other gods with Him and belief [in Him alone]. There is nothing that can defeat His predetermined purpose, and none to question His dominion. 'He leads astray whomsoever He will, and He guides whomsoever He will'; 'He shall not be questioned as to what He does, but they shall be questioned.'

All of this is confirmed in the traditional unanimity of the community that what God wills comes into being, and what He does not never comes into being. It is further

confirmed by the word of God most high: 'If God had willed, He would have guided men all together'; 'If We had so willed, We could have given every soul its guidance.'

It is still further confirmed by [human] reason: if disobedience to God and crime, abhorrent to God and not willed by Him but rather willed by the devil iblts (God curse him!) it would mean that what takes place in accordance with the will of this enemy is greater than what takes place in accordance with His will most high. I cannot imagine a Muslim permitting himself to reduce the status of the mighty God from His position of majesty and honour to a level which were a village chief reduced to it he would disdain to accept it. For if he found that the writ of his enemy in the village runs further than his own he would disdain his chieftainship and renounce his office.

The prevalence of disobedience among His creatures is explained by the deviators (mubtadi ah') as contrary to the will of God, thus reducing Him to the most extremes of weakness and impotence. May He the supreme Lord be exalted very high above this essay (qaul) of the unjust (zalimun). Thus the more it is realized that the actions of His servants are created by God the more it becomes correct that they are willed by Him If it is asked 'why does He forbid what He wills, and orders what He does not will?' we would reply that order (amr) is different from will (iradah).Hence [the following example] :

A master strikes his slave and is rebuked by the sultan. He offers as an excuse the rebellious conduct of the slave, but the sultan refuses to believe him. Desirous of proving himself right he gives an order which he knows the slave would disobey in the presence of the sultan. 'Saddle that beast!' he said, thus ordering what he really does not want the slave to obey. But without giving the order his excuse would not have been apparent to the sultan. On the other hand, if he really wanted obedience he would have wanted his own destruction which is impossible.

(4) The fourth fundamental is that creation, creation from nothing and the imposition of duties (taklif) upon His servants are by His grace and favour the most high. Neither creation nor such imposition was ever an obligation (wdjib) upon Him. The Mu'tazilah maintain that they were obligations upon Him because they are in the interest (maslahah) of His servants. But this is impossible since it is He who imposes obligation (mujib), He who commands and He who prohibits. How can He be liable to any obligation or be subject to any compulsion or command?

Obligation here has two meanings: (a) either [the performance of] an act the neglect of which will result in future or immediate injury future as in the statement 'It is the duty of the servant to obey God so that He will not torture him in hell-fire in the next world',

and immediate as in the statement ‘He who is thirsty must drink [water] lest he dies (b) or anything [the assumption of] the non-existence of which would lead to what is impossible such as the statement that [recognition of] the existence of what is known is obligatory, since its non-existence would lead to an impossibility which is the conversion of knowledge into ignorance.

If the [Mu'tazili] adversary attaches the first meaning to his assertion that creation is an obligation upon God, he makes Him liable to injury if he adopts the second meaning he has lost the argument, for [he recognizes that] the existence of the known is inevitable after fore-knowledge of it. But if he intends a third meaning he does not make himself intelligible. His assertion that [creation and imposition of duties are] obligatory in the interest of His servants is fallacious. For if no injury befalls Him through neglecting what is in the interest of the servants then obligation would be meaningless. Further, the interest of the servants is for Him to create them in Paradise, and thus those endowed with intelligence find no comfort in that He created the servants in the abode of calamities and exposed them in it to sin, and later He subjects them to the dangers of punishment and the awe of resurrection and judgement.

(5) The fifth fundamental is that, contrary to al-Mu'tazilah, God (glory be to Him) may impose obligations on the servants which are beyond their ability. For were it not so, it would be impossible for them to pray Him not to impose it; and they did in fact pray Him saying: ‘Our Lord, do Thou not burden us beyond what we have strength to bear.’ Also because God most high informed His Prophet (God bless him and save him) that Abu Jahl would not believe him, and then He commanded the Prophet to call Abu Jahl to believe all God’s words which included the [prediction] of Abu Jahl’s disbelief. How then could he believe Him by not believing? Is this [proposition] anything but impossible to conceive?

(6) The sixth fundamental is that, again contrary to al-Mu'tazilah, God (to whom glory and majesty belong) may inflict pain on His creatures or torment them for no previous offence or subsequent reward. For He has absolute control over [His creatures in] His dominion, and any dominion outside it is inconceivable for His control to embrace it. Thus injustice, which is the disposal of what belongs to others without permission, is impossible in God most high, for He encounters no possessions of others besides Him so that His disposal of these possessions could be injustice.

Now the proof that [causing pain for no offence or reward] is permissible (ja'iz) is its presence in practice’ Thus the slaughter of animals, and the various kinds of torture they suffer at the hands of man, is for no previous offence they committed. If it is said that God will reward such animals in the next world for what they had suffered, and that this

was incumbent upon Him, we would reply as follows: He would go beyond the bounds of religious law and reason who would maintain that it is incumbent upon God to bring back to life every ant killed under the feet and every bug crushed between the fingers, in order to reward it for its suffering. For he would thereby consider bringing to life and rewarding as obligations on Him. But this is impossible if he means it would be harmful for Him to neglect; if he means otherwise we have already shown that it is not intelligible, since it is not in accordance with the meaning of obligation we mentioned [at the end of the fifth fundamental.]

(7) The seventh fundamental is that He most high does what He wills with His servants, and it is not incumbent upon Him to do what is most favourable (< aslah) for them, because of what we have already explained namely that nothing is incumbent upon Him, nay, obligation in relation to Him is inconceivable. For verily ‘He shall not be questioned as to what He does, but they shall be questioned’.

Considering the Mu’tazili contention that it is incumbent upon God to do the favourable for His servants, I wonder what his reply would be to the following question we pose for him: Let him assume a comparison in the next world between two who died Muslims, a minor boy and a mature adult. According to the Mu’tazili doctrine it is incumbent upon God to elevate and prefer the adult over the boy on account of his toil in belief and worship after maturity. Suppose the boy prayed ‘O Lord! why hast thou elevated him over me?’, and God would say ‘Because after maturity he was diligent in worship.’ Then the boy would say ‘Lord! thou hast caused me to die a child ; it was incumbent upon Thee to prolong my life till maturity so that I could be diligent; Thou hast deviated from justice by favouring him with long life, but not me; why hast thou [so] favoured him?’ And God would say ‘Because I knew you would take associates with me or disobey me had you attained maturity; it was best for you (al-aflah) to die a child’. Such would be the Mu’tazili’s excuse on behalf of God (to whom glory and majesty belong) ! Hearing this [dialogue with God,] the infidels from the abyss of hell would call: ‘O Lord, hast thou not known that we would have taken associates with Thee on attaining maturity, why hast thou not caused us to die in childhood? We would have been content [in paradise] with a lower status than that of the Muslim boy!’ With what could this question be answered? None except a definite decision that divine questions are too sublime and majestic to be decided by the logic (mizan) of the Mu’tazilah.

If it is argued that it would be [morally] ugly and unworthy of His wisdom, while possessing the power to do the most favourable for His servants, He subjects them to what earns them punishment, we would reply: The meaning of ugly is that which does not suit the desires [of man], so that the same thing could be ugly to one person and

pleasant to another according to whether or not it suits his desire. Thus the murder of a person is an ugly act to his relatives but desirable to his enemies.

If [in the above argument] it is meant by ugly that which does not suit the Lord's desire then it is impossible: He has no desire, and it is inconceivable that anything ugly, or injustice, should proceed from Him, since it is inconceivable that He should dispose of possessions other than His own. If, on the other hand, it is meant by ugly that which does not suit the desire of another [besides the Lord], then why did you [i.e. the Mu'tazilah] maintain that it was impossible for Him? Is this anything but a vain attachment [to a doctrine] disproved by our supposed plea of the [infidels] in hell?

The wise (hakim) [in reference to Him] means the all-knowing (' alirri) of the realities of all things and the all-powerful (qadir) to perfect their make according to His will (iradah). This being so, in what way could it be made incumbent upon Him to do the most favourable to His servants? On the other hand the wise among us [men] is he who seeks the most favourable for himself so that he will earn praise in this world and reward in the next or to ward off evil from himself — all of which is impossible for God most high.

(8) The eighth fundamental is that the knowledge (ma'rifah) of God and obedience (to' ah) to Him is a duty imposed [upon man] by God's command and law (shar '), and not as the Mu'tazilah maintain by human reason (' aql). For were obedience dictated by reason, it would be either for no benefit, which is impossible, since reason does not dictate what is futile, or it would be for a benefit and selfish aim. This [motive] must either refer to God (< al-ma' bud) which is impossible since He is inviolably above selfish aims and desires, nay, belief and unbelief, obedience and disobedience are in reference to Him most high indifferently alike; or it must refer to man's (al^abd) selfish aim which is also impossible since his [expected] benefit is either in this world or in the next : in this world he has none but that which causes him toil and deflects him from indulging his sensual appetites; in the next he can expect nothing but reward and punishment. But how can [man] know that God most high rewards for obedience and disobedience and does not punish for them, since obedience and disobedience are in reference to Him indifferently alike, and He has no preference to, or identification with, the one or the other?

It is only through God's Law (shar ') that such matters can be comprehended; and verily he errs who derives his comprehension of them from an analogy between the Creator and His creature, who [unlike the Creator] is not indifferent to gratitude and ingratitude and the amount of satisfaction, excitement, and enjoyment which he derives from the one and not from the other . Here someone might say this: If the scrutiny and

knowledge [of the faith] are obligatory only through the law, and the law cannot be understood by the one called to belief (mukallaf) without scrutiny, such one might answer the prophet who calls him to belief ‘Reason does not dictate scrutiny to me, and I cannot comprehend the law without scrutiny, but I do not wish to undertake scrutiny [unless it has been made obligatory]’ — will that lead to silencing the prophet?

We would say in reply that this supposition resembles the following dialogue. One person says to another standing in a certain place: ‘There is surely behind you a carnivorous lion; if you do not leave your place he will kill you, and if you look back you will see my truthfulness.’ The one standing retorts ‘Your truthfulness will not be established unless I look back, and I do not look back to see unless your truthfulness is proven’ This retort indicates the foolishness of the one who made it and his exposure to destruction, but there is no harm in his attitude to the person who gave him the warning.

Such is the case with the prophet of God . He would say to men Venily there is behind you death and this side of it carnivorous lions and burning fires. If you are not on your guard against them, and if you do not acknowledge my truthfulness confirmed by my miracle, you will perish. He who will look round will know, take precautions, and be saved; but he who will not look round and persists [in his folly] will perish. No harm will befall me even if all men perished [in this way]. Mine is merely to give clear warning.’

Now the law recognizes the existence of carnivorous lions after death, and reason helps towards the understanding of the prophet’s speech and the comprehension of the possibility of what he says concerning the future, and human nature itself takes precaution against what is harmful. It is meant by obligatory (wajib) anything the neglect of which is harmful; it is meant by the law as obligating (mujib) that it warns of expected harm [in case of neglect.] But when sensual appetites reign supreme, reason does not warn of harm after death.

This is then the meaning of law and reason and their respective influence in determining what is obligatory. Obligation (wujub) would not be established but for fear of punishment for neglecting what is prescribed. Hence obligatory has no meaning except that its neglect is connected with harm in the hereafter.

(9) The ninth fundamental is that the mission (bi'thah) of prophets is not impossible. This is contrary to the Brahmans who maintain that no benefit could be derived from sending prophets since reason is a [better]alternative to them. [But reason is not an alternative] because it does not guide to works which earn salvation in the hereafter, just as it does not guide to medicines useful to health [in this world] . Hence the need of

God's creatures for prophets is as their need for physicians, but whereas the truthfulness of the physician may be known through trial, that of the prophet is known by miracle.

(10) The tenth fundamental is that God most high sent Muhammad (God bless and save him) as the seal of prophets and as an abrogator of the [religious] laws of the Jews, Christians, and Sabaeans that existed before him, and confirmed him with clear miracles and dazzling signs, such as the splitting of the moon, the praise of [God by] the pebbles, the causing of mute animals to speak, the gushing of water from between his fingers, and the clear sign of the great Qur'an with which He challenged all the Arabs.

For they defamed the Prophet, asked him to desist, and even attempted to kill him. But despite their distinction in eloquence and rhetoric they failed to confront him with anything like the Qur'an. The reason is that it is beyond human capacity to imitate its purity of language and style, let alone what it contains of reports about ancient peoples [proclaimed by a prophet] who was illiterate and did not read books, and what it contains of forecasts of the unknown which future events proved true, as in His words the most high: 'you shall enter the Holy Mosque, if God wills in security, your heads shaved, your hair cut short' ; ' Alif Lam Mim. The Greeks have been vanquished in the nearer part of the land; and, after their vanquishing, they shall be the victors in a few years.'

That miracles are proof of the truthfulness of God's messengers is clear from the fact that what man cannot do must be the work of God most high. Therefore whatever [miracle] the messenger links to his challenge [to the people] amounts to a confirmation of his truthfulness by God. Here is an example. A man standing before the king, with claims that he is the king's messenger to his subjects, seeks to prove it to those present. He says to the king: 'If I am truthful, then stand up and sit down three times on your throne contrary to your habit.' Should the king do that he would thereby furnish those present with certain knowledge that his action amounts to saying 'you are truthful'.

The Fourth Pillar of the Faith is Beliefs Accepted on Authority and Believing the Prophet's Reports , Comprises Ten Fundamentals.

(1) The first fundamental is belief in the resurrection (hashr) and reckoning (nashr) [with the dead on the Last Day]. Both are mentioned in the authenticated law (shar') and belief in them is obligatory, since [also] they are mentally possible. Their meaning is restoration to life after death which, like the initial creation, is within the power of God most high who said [of a certain unbeliever]: 'He says, "who shall quicken the bones when they are decayed?"' Say [the command is to Muhammad] "He shall quicken them, who originated them the first time.'" Restoration [to life] is thus proven by the

initial creation. He also said (to whom glory and majesty belong) : ‘Your creation and your upraising are but as that of a single soul. Thus restoration is a second creation which is as possible as the first.

(2) The second fundamental is the interrogation of [the dead by the two angels] Munkar and Nakir. This is covered by traditional reports (akhbar) and belief in it is obligatory since [also] it is mentally possible: it requires no more than restoring life to that part of the body which comprehends speech. This in itself is possible, and cannot be denied by [citing as an example] the apparent helplessness (sukun) of the members of the body of the dead and by our inability to hear its interrogation. For although a person asleep appears outwardly helpless (sakin) he inwardly feels pain and pleasure and feels their effects on awakening. Thus the Messenger of God (God bless and save him) used to hear the voice of Jibril (peace be upon him) and to see him, while those around neither heard nor saw him. ‘And they comprehend not anything of His knowledge save such as He wills.’ For unless He created in them [special faculties for] hearing and seeing they would not have been aware of him.

(3) The third fundamental is the torment of [the dead in] the grave, which is mentioned in the law (shar'). s God most high said: ‘. the fire to which they shall be exposed morning and evening; and on the day when the Hour is come: “Admit the folk of Pharaoh into the most terrible chastisement!”’ It is also well attested that the Messenger of God (God bless and save him) and the righteous ancestors of the community used to pray God to save them from [future] torment in the grave. It is [also] mentally possible and thus it is obligatory to believe in it. Belief must not be withheld [even] on the ground that the members of a dead body were scattered in the bellies of lions and the gizzards of birds, for pain of punishment is felt only by particular members of the body to which God most high has the power to restore feeling.

(4) The fourth fundamental is [the weighing of the actions of men by] the balance (; mtzan). It is valid truth. God most high said: ‘And We shall set up the just balances for the Resurrection Day’; 11 ‘He whose scales are heavy — they are the prosperers, and he whose scales are light — they have lost their souls/ And the manner of weighing is as follows: God most high causes the [record] sheets (. saha'if) of His servants’ actions to show a weight according to their degree in His estimation, so that they realize the justice of His exacting punishment or His grace in forgiveness and multiplying the reward.

(5) The fifth fundamental is [the ordeal of passing over] the bridge (sir at) which is spread across and over the middle of Hell, finer than a hair and sharper than the edge of a sword. God most high said: ‘And guide them [who did evil and worshipped other gods]

unto the path of Hell, and halt them to be questioned.’ This is [mentally] possible and thus it is obligatory to believe in it. For He who has power to make the bird fly in the air has the power to make man walk over such a bridge.

(6) The sixth fundamental is that Paradise and Hell are created. God most high said: ‘And vie with one another, hasting to forgiveness from your Lord, and to a garden whose breadth is as the heavens and earth, prepared for the godfearing.’ The word of God ‘prepared’ proves that it is created. The literal meaning of the verse must be adopted, since it involves no impossibility. Nor is it valid to say [with the Mu’tazilah] that there is no use (faidah) in creating Paradise and Hell before the day of reckoning, since God most high ‘Shall not be questioned as to what He does, but they shall be questioned’.

(7) The seventh fundamental is that the legitimate imam after the Messenger of God (may God bless and save him) is Abu Bakr, then 'Umar, then 'Uthman, and then 'Ali (may God be gracious to them.) The Messenger of God never nominated (nassa c ala) an imam himself. For had he done so, the fact would have gained more prominence than his appointment of individual administrators (wulatun) or military commanders (umara'un 'ala l junud) in certain parts. If such appointments were well known, how could [the appointment of Muhammad’s successor as imam of the community] be unknown? Even if it were known [for some time], how could it disappear altogether without being transmitted to us?

Nay, Abu Bakr was not made the imam except by election (l ikhtiyar) and public homage (bai'ali). To assume that there was an explicit injunction (nass) designating someone else is tantamount to accusing all the Companions of disobeying the Messenger of God and acting contrary to the consensus (ijma) of the community. Only the Rawafid could be so daring to invent [such insinuation].

To the orthodox (ahl as-sunnah) it is an article of belief to uphold the integrity of all the Companions and to praise them, since God and His Messenger praised them. As to what happened between 'Ali and Mu'awiyah (may God be gracious to them) it was due to [a difference of honest] opinion (ijtiha d), not to a contest on the part of Mu'awiyah [to wrest] the imamate. 'Ali thought that the handing over of the assassins of 'Uthman might cause disturbance to [his?] imamate in its early days, since those assassins infiltrated his army which included numerous tribes to which the assassins belonged. Accordingly he considered it more correct (aswab) to delay. Mu'awiyah thought that, considering the enormity of the assassins’ crime, delay would encourage attacks on the imams and might lead to bloodshed.

The excellent among the learned said ‘Everyone who expresses a considered opinion is correct’ — kullu mujtahidin muslb. Others said: ‘Only one can be correct’ — al-musibu wahidun. But no one endowed with learning has ever declared 'Ali wrong.

(8) The eighth fundamental is that the excellence of the Companions (may God be gracious to them) is according to their order in the Caliphate. For true excellence is that which is excellent in the sight of God, and that is disclosed to no one except the Messenger of God. The praise of the Companions occurs in many verses [of the Qur'an] and many reports [in the Tradition]. But none except eye-witnesses, who were contemporaneous with the revelation [to Muhammad] and knew its contextual circumstances and its minute details, can grasp the fine components of excellence and the hierarchical order respecting it.

But for such understanding the Companions would not have ordered the affair [of the imamate] as they did. For no reproach from any reproached could deter them from the path of God nor could any obstruct or deflect them from truth.

(9) The ninth fundamental is the qualifications for the imamate. Next to Islam and taklif the qualifications are five: masculinity (dhukurah), piety (warn), religious learning ('ilm), competence (kafa'ah), and kinship to Quraish. The last because of his words (may God bless and save him): ‘The imams are from Quraish .’ Should there be several candidates with these qualifications, the imam [from among them] is the one who receives public homage (baiah) from the majority of the people (khalq). He who goes against this majority is iniquitous (baghin) and must be brought back [by force?] to the way of justice (haqq).

(10) The tenth fundamental: If piety and learning should not be possessed by a seeker of the imamate, and if deterring him could lead to inevitable civil strife (fitnah), then we must decide that his imamate is legally binding (in'iqad). For in such situation we have only two alternatives: The first is to cause strife in the attempt to replace him, in which case the Muslim community will suffer more damage than from the want of the qualifications [of piety and learning in the imam]. These were stipulated as advantageous for the welfare (i maslahah) of the community, but obsession with these advantages must not lead to demolishing the welfare itself. [Otherwise we should be] like him who builds a palace but demolishes a metropolis. The second alternative is to decide that there is no [legally constituted] imam in the land and that all legal decisions are incorrect . This is impossible. We acknowledge as indispensable for their needs the authority of the law of the iniquitous (ahlu'l baghi) in their own countries, how then could we withhold recognition of the legality of the imamate [of the less qualified] at moments of need and necessity?

These, then, are the four pillars which comprise the forty fundamentals . They are the foundations of belief; he who embraces them identifies himself with the orthodox believers and contradicts the band of innovators .

May God most high direct us aright through His succour and guide us to the truth and its realization through His favour and unlimited bounty . [May He bless our Lord Muhammad and bless his family and every servant He favours .]